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The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to provide no privacy protection for records held by third
parties. The American Bar Association recently sought to step into this
breach by recommending standards to govern government access to thirdparty electronic records, such as those held by banks, Internet service
providers, and medical care providers.
Those standards retain
requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion for government
access respectively to highly protected and moderately protected records.
Law enforcement has challenged these requirements as unduly burdensome,
while some commentators have argued that probable cause and reasonable
suspicion are so easy to prove in the third-party records context as to
provide no effective privacy protection at all. This Article challenges both
those views by defining with greater specificity than has yet been
accomplished the meaning of two aspects of probable cause: the
quantitative and the qualitative. The Article also addresses their social
value by exploring cognitive science, philosophy on the nature of
probability, and political incentives facing police and prosecutors. The
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Article also examines the evidentiary concept of “weight” and analyzes the
implications of various technological processes for applying these
justification requirements in the third-party electronic-records context. The
Article ultimately concludes that retaining probable cause and reasonable
suspicion protections—when coupled with additional protections provided
by the standards—is neither oppressive of law enforcement nor
underprotective of persons whose records are searched. Instead, the
balance achieved by the standards in this area is just right.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has created a general Fourth
Amendment principle—the “third-party doctrine”—that leaves information
in the hands of third parties unprotected by that Amendment.1 Yet in an
electronic age, increasingly more information concerning personal matters
is held by third parties—from banks to insurance companies, Internet
service providers, and credit card companies—in readily accessible
electronic databases.2 The American Bar Association has sought to fill this
void in criminal cases by adopting its Standards on Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records.3 The Standards set out a template for

1

The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine:

[We] ha[ve] held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The doctrine is not monolithic, however.
The holding in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (exposing luggage to
third-party exploration did not mean exposing it to the type of exploration there engaged in
by the police), for example, is inconsistent with the doctrine. Justice Sotomayor has openly
called for reconsidering the doctrine in technological surveillance cases. See United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital
age . . . .”) (citations omitted). The doctrine remains controversial among academic
commentators. Compare Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 40 (2011) (seeing signs of the
doctrine’s erosion and wishing it a timely death), with Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the ThirdParty Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564 (2009) (defending the doctrine).
2 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE
LOST RIGHT 27–37, 45–58 (2008) (summarizing the scope of third-party technological access
to personal information).
3 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
criminal_justice_standards/Black_Letter.authcheckdam.pdf. But these Standards do not
apply to “access to records after the initiation and in the course of a criminal prosecution.”
Id. § 25-2.1(b).
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regulating government access to institutional third-party records in criminal
investigations.4 These standards are novel, marking the first time that a
well-respected legal organization has provided a template for drafting
statutes at the state and federal level to govern this area.5
The Standards provide numerous protections and procedures,6 but
among them is a sliding scale of levels of justification—probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, and mere relevance7—as well as variations in who
must make these determinations (courts versus law enforcement).8 The
justification levels vary with the degree of privacy protection a particular
record deserves.9 These justification provisions would, however, change
much of the current law.10 Indeed, the internal debates in the task force that
prepared the initial drafts (the “drafting committee”) were most fierce
concerning this single issue.11 Law enforcement members were vehemently
opposed to any justification requirement whatsoever, predicting that
4

See id. § 25-3.4.
See AM. BAR ASS’N, BACKGROUND REPORT TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/
Memo_House.authcheckdam.pdf (“But because the federal constitutional regulation has
been slight, and because other regulation has occurred in an ad hoc manner, there is no
existing framework via which legislatures, courts acting in their supervisory capacities, and
agencies can make the difficult decisions regarding what records should be protected and the
scope of such protection.”).
6 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS §§ 25-5.7 (notice), 25-6.1–6.2 (limiting record maintenance, retention, and
disclosure), 25-7.1 (providing accountability mechanisms).
7 See id. § 25-5.2.
8 See id.
9 See id. §§ 25-4.2, 25-5.2.
10 For example, federal Fourth Amendment constitutional protections against
government access to third-party records are minimal, if they exist, see supra text
accompanying note 1, and a patchwork of state and federal legislation addresses specific
privacy issues or broad information categories, see MILLS, supra note 2, at 130–32, 135–37
(discussing, for example, protection of educational information, trade secrets, and
proprietary information), while the Standards protect records based largely upon how private
the information they contain is rather than a particular issue or broad subject-matter
category. See infra text accompanying note 52.
11 The drafting committee did not keep minutes of or record its meetings.
I was,
however, a member of that committee. My characterizations here are based partly on my
recollections of the committee’s meetings and partly on the content of the law enforcement
members’ report dissenting from a draft of the Standards. Gary Lacey & Norman W. Frink,
Dissent from ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Government Access to Records: Third
Parties and Privacy, Standards DRAFT 6.0 (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology) [hereinafter Dissenting Report]. I was
also a member of the Criminal Justice Section Council, which reviewed and modified a later
version of the Standards. The Council does not keep transcripts of its meetings, so here too I
rely on my memory of relevant events.
5
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criminal investigations in serious cases would be rendered virtually
impossible. The judge, defense lawyers, and law professors on the drafting
committee, however, saw some level of justification as essential to prevent
governmental overreaching—to regulate, without prohibiting, legitimate
law enforcement work.
So strong were law enforcement’s objections that the early drafting
committee efforts concerning levels of justification were substantially
watered-down. This dilution first occurred within the drafting committee,
then in the Standards Committee that reviews the drafting committee’s
work, and later still in the Criminal Justice Section Council that had the
final word before sending the Standards to be ratified by the ABA House of
Delegates—which they ultimately were. For example, jurisdictions were
left with freedom to have reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, as the
maximum level of justification required for certain highly private records.12
Moreover, the Council insisted on a provision declaring that the standards
would not alter traditional grand jury practice, essentially leaving current
subpoena practice (requiring barely any level of justification) untouched.13
The general scheme of varying levels of required justification used by
the drafting committee—though not the details—stemmed from the work of
leading Fourth Amendment commentator Christopher Slobogin.14
Importantly, however, the idea of a sliding scale model of justification
levels—though not embracing necessarily the same levels of justification as
does Slobogin—is not limited to the Standards. There are a host of federal
and state privacy statutes that already provide some limited justificationstandard protections for some searches of third-party records in some
circumstances.15 Critics have argued for moving these protections up a
12

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-4.2(b) (“If the limitation imposed by subdivision (a) would render law
enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or
preventable crime, such that the benefits of respecting privacy are outweighed by this social
cost, a legislature may consider reducing, to the limited extent necessary to correct this
imbalance, the level of protection for that type of information, so long as doing so does not
violate the federal or applicable state constitution.”).
13 See id. § 25-2.1(c).
14 See
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 186 (2007). Slobogin’s scheme treats “eventdriven” and “target-driven” searches differently, see id. at 9–13, a distinction that I need not
define here because it is one that the Standards ultimately rejected.
15 See id. at 139, 179–80 (summarizing the varied statutory protections for “transactional
surveillance”—“the accessing of records about activities that have already occurred”—and
concluding that most require mere relevance or nothing as a standard of justification). But
see Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2006); id. § 2703(a) (requiring
probable cause for government access to some e-mail messages stored with Internet service
providers for under 180 days); id. § 2703(d) (necessitating a grand jury subpoena, requiring
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notch, that is, for example, to require probable cause for all government
access to stored e-mail content.16 But these efforts, as with similar intradrafting-committee efforts, have sparked intense law enforcement
opposition.17 The wisdom of the Standards’ sliding scale model thus has
wide significance for current law and future legal developments.
One member of the drafting committee, Professor Paul Ohm, has
published an article rejecting Slobogin’s premise that levels of justification
matter and have practical significance in the area of electronic evidence in
criminal cases.18 Ohm argues that it is so easy to establish probable cause
in most criminal investigations involving e-mail or the Internet that law
enforcement objections have not been justified. Ohm argues, therefore, that
there is no need for a sliding scale because probable cause will usually exist
and that it alone provides too little protection in an electronic age.19
Although Ohm’s view undercuts much of law enforcement’s standard
antijustification (whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion) position,
Ohm does not clearly argue for increasing (or decreasing) the standard for
probable cause, redefining it, or replacing it. Instead, he merely suggests at
several points that probable cause in this area is so easy to prove and of so
little value in restraining government and protecting privacy that law reform
efforts should shift to other areas.20 Probable cause and reasonable
suspicion can usually simply be ignored.
But Ohm concedes that there are still instances—though he believes
relatively few ones—in which Internet and e-mail investigations will be
amenable to regulation by standards of justification like probable cause and

mere relevance, or, for e-mails stored over 180 days, an order alleging “specific and
articulable facts showing there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire
or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation”); SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 175–76
(explaining that the “specific and articulable” language in § 2703(d) sounds like “reasonable
suspicion” but is in fact a far lower standard).
16 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1436 (2004) (“Congress should apply a uniform search warrant
standard to all stored communications and should require notice of the search in most
cases.”); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1557, 1592 (2004).
17 See Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of
Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1524 (2010) (noting that the Department of
Justice has opposed, and likely in the future will oppose, efforts to raise the standards of
justification for governmental technological surveillance).
18 See id. at 1523–24.
19 See id. at 1514–16.
20 See id. at 1516.
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reasonable suspicion.21 Whether these instances will in fact be as rare as
Ohm argues is subject to dispute.22 Furthermore, the Standards themselves
address some important situations, such as obtaining medical information or
acting where First Amendment free speech concerns may be implicated,
that merit high levels of protection even if they occur infrequently. 23
Moreover, Ohm focuses on cybercrime investigations rather than
investigations of ordinary crimes (e.g., murder, rape, robbery) that may
nevertheless leave a digital trail24—but he does not limit his claims to
cybercrimes.25 Yet the latter sort of evidence should become increasingly
important as technology advances. He simply underemphasizes the
different issues ordinary crimes raise. But ordinary crimes leaving digital
trails are often far less likely than cybercrimes to leave themselves open to
easy proof of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.26
Perhaps most importantly, however, Ohm does not explore in a more
theoretical way the meaning and social value of the two main standards of
justification—probable cause and reasonable suspicion. I agree with Ohm
that many protections are required other than standards of justification. But
standards of justification can still serve important social goals, even in
Internet investigations, that should not be slighted. Moreover, the two
major justification standard terms (“probable cause” and “reasonable
21

See id. at 1542–49.
See SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 168–70 (making the case that several of these
categories of government surveillance where justification standards can make a difference
are far from rare).
23 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS §§ 25-3.3, 25-4.1 (2012).
24 See Ohm, supra note 17, at 1525–42 (offering cybercrime examples). There is no
uniform, agreed-upon definition of “cybercrime.” See Ralph D. Clifford, Introduction to
CYBERCRIME: THE INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF A COMPUTER-RELATED
CRIME 3, 3–5 (Ralph D. Clifford ed., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CYBERCRIME]. I define
“cybercrime” here as any crime in which the criminal act is committed by using a computer,
e-mail, or the Internet, rather than an ordinary crime that merely leaves evidentiary traces on
computers or the Internet. Cf. Susan W. Brenner, Defining Cybercrime: A Review of State
and Federal Law, in CYBERCRIME, supra, at 13, 14–19 (seemingly broadly defining
cybercrime to include any use of computer technology to commit crime, but noting that
different issues are involved where computers are the target or instrumentality of a crime as
compared to crimes where “the computer plays a non-essential role in the commission of the
offense”). Examples of cybercrime include hacking, computer fraud, Internet threats, online
stalking, and Internet distribution of child pornography. I use the term “cybersurveillance”
to refer to government surveillance of any computer-created or stored information, thus
including government access to computer records relevant to prove only “ordinary crimes”
such as most murders, rapes, face-to-face scams, and simple drug sales.
25 See Ohm, supra note 17, at 1515 (suggesting that his argument extends to any non“traditional” investigations, that is, those involving “modern technology,” and declaring that
“the Internet is a hunch-free zone”).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 365–371.
22
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suspicion”) are rarely defined with any specificity. Part of the ease of
meeting them may be the ambiguity in definition and the signals that these
definitions send that they do not place much of a proof burden on law
enforcement.
This Article seeks to fill this gap by exploring whether the key
justification standards can be more specifically defined, what those
definitions should be, and what social value the standards serve. The
Article applies the results of this exploration to the ABA Standards,
explaining whether they are justified as is or whether another course of
action concerning levels of justification would have been more desirable.
A few qualifications are in order. I limit my analysis to targeted
investigations, that is, the search for a particular person as the perpetrator of
a crime or of a particular place believed connected to a known criminal
event.27 I therefore do not address “general search[es],” those occurring
where “the government is trying to solve, prevent or deter as-yet undetected
or perpetrated crime through surveillance of the general population or a
subset of it . . . .”28 Many of the comments made here have implications
beyond targeted investigations, but space prevents me from addressing
them here.
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the provisions and history of
the ABA Standards. Those Standards are the jumping-off point for a fuller
exploration of the meanings of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
In two earlier articles, I identified the several aspects of justification
standards like probable cause and reasonable suspicion.29 Those articles did
not, however, fully develop two of those aspects that I now address in
depth: (1) The quantitative—how probable must it be that evidence of
crime will be found in possession of the third party? (2) The qualitative—
how trustworthy must the evidence be upon which law enforcement relies in

27 See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory 12–13 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch.,
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 12-29; Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 1222, 2012).
28 Id. at 13. Slobogin defines “probable cause” to include a belief “based on statistical
analysis.” Id. at 20. I do not disagree that statistical analysis can often be part of the basis
for probable cause. To the extent that Slobogin suggests that statistical analysis can alone
establish probable cause, however, I disagree for reasons to be explained shortly.
29 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and
Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 7 (2010) [hereinafter Taslitz, Cognitive Obstacles]; Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is
Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of
Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2010) [hereinafter Taslitz,
Individualized Suspicion].
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finding the relevant standard met?30 Here, in Part III, I will necessarily
touch on all aspects of probable cause and reasonable suspicion because
they are interrelated. But my primary focus in Part III will be on aspects (1)
and (2): the quantitative and the qualitative. Concerning the quantitative,
Parts III.A.1 to 2 respond to arguments that it is more socially beneficial
entirely to avoid setting a quantitative standard of proof for probable cause
and reasonable suspicion. Part III.A.3 explains why, contrary to the claims
of critics, cognitive biases are not enhanced by identifying a specific
standard of proof, but such specification would appropriately limit law
enforcement discretion. Perhaps more importantly, Part III.A.4 explains
that the critics have wrongly assumed an objective notion of probability
(how often are certain events likely to occur over many repetitions?) rather
than a subjective notion (what degree of confidence or certitude does the
factfinder justifiably hold in the determination made?). Subjective
probability, subjected to standards of rational belief as reflected in social
processes involved in the adversarial system, is the soundest way to
approach unique legal events like the probable cause and reasonable
suspicion determinations under particular sets of facts, and it more
accurately describes the judicial reasoning process (Part III.A.4).31 Part
30

The other three aspects of probable cause and reasonable suspicion that I earlier
identified were: (1) the temporal: when the probable cause or reasonable suspicion judgment
is to be made and whether its timing affects its meaning; (2) the individualized: whether that
evidence points to a specific location revealing involvement of a specific person in crime;
and (3) the accountable: what procedures render the probable cause affiant accountable for
his claims such that courts or other reviewing entities oversee the police and avoid being
mere rubber stamps for law enforcement judgments. My earlier pieces focused on the last
two of these three aspects. See Taslitz, Cognitive Obstacles, supra note 29; Taslitz,
Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29. I leave a more thorough analysis of the temporal
aspect of justification standards for another day.
31 Logicians, mathematicians, and their fellow travelers in legal academia might bristle at
the way I use the term “subjective probability.” They would understand subjective
probability to refer to each individual’s level of certitude that an event will occur or has
occurred or that a proposition is true, and would require that certitude comply with certain
standards of coherence. See DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PROBABILITY 1
(2000) (“The subjective theory identifies probability with the degree of belief of a particular
individual.”); IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 127,
151–53, 163–65 (2001) (explaining how “personal probabilities” can be measured by odds
or betting and defining “coherence” in personal probability judgments). Two individuals’
subjective probabilities as so defined can be wildly different, and neither one can objectively
be said to be “better” than the other so long as both are coherent—that is, inductively
consistent in a way that supports the rules of probability. See GILLIES, supra, at 1 (noting
that the subjective theory of probability does not assume that “all rational human beings with
the same evidence will have the same degree of belief in a hypothesis or prediction”);
HACKING, supra, at 180 (discussing inductive consistency and coherence). I am using the
term in a slightly different fashion. Probability theories can broadly be grouped into the
objective, for example, how frequently an event occurs in a broad run of identical activities
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III.A.5 next explains why sound policy and the cognitive science of
metaphorical reasoning support choosing a preponderance of the
evidence—which relies on the metaphor of a tipping scale—as the proper
standard of proof. Additionally, Part III.B analyzes the idea of “weight,”
which explores the completeness and trustworthiness of the evidence
offered to prove probable cause or reasonable suspicion. This Part
concludes that courts should give little, if any, weight to incomplete or
shoddy supporting evidence. Finally, this Part applies these lessons to the
Standards, explaining, contrary to Ohm and other critics, why justification
standards still matter in governing government access to digital third-party
records.
Part IV, the Conclusion, brings together the preceding discussion and
explores some of its implications.

(e.g., how often heads shows up in 1,000 flips of a coin) and the psychological, a state of
mind consisting of degrees of certitude. Id. at 127 (“The idea of probability leads in two
different directions: belief and frequency. Probability [in the first sense] makes us think of
the degree to which we can be confident of something uncertain, given what we know or can
find out.”) (emphasis in original). I use the term “subjective probability” to refer to
psychological certitude. But I do not use the term to mean psychological certitude that
cannot be subjected to standards of critique. Rather, there are standards of rational inference
involved in everyday reasoning and in legal reasoning and social processes created by our
justice system that permit debate over the rationality of people’s differing senses of certitude.
See generally RAYMOND S. NICKERSON, ASPECTS OF RATIONALITY: REFLECTIONS ON WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE RATIONAL AND WHETHER WE ARE (2008) (discussing at book length the
standards of rational inference in everyday life and in special contexts and connecting the
two). Critique in light of these rational inference standards and through these social
processes results in either agreement among the parties on the appropriate degree of certitude
or acceptance by a decisionmaker (such as a judge) of a degree of certitude that the
decisionmaker can publicly justify. See infra note 211. (I am not adopting the “logical
theory” of probability, which does “identif[y] probability with degree of rational belief” but
assumes that “given the same evidence, all rational human beings will entertain the same
degree of belief in a hypothesis or prediction”—a far stronger claim than I make here. See
GILLIES, supra, at 1 (defining logical theory of probability and discussing the “propensity”
theory, which is not relevant here and is thus not discussed further).) This understanding of
subjective probability more accurately reflects how the legal system does and should operate
in making probability judgments where unique events, like those supposedly governed by
the probable cause standard, are involved. I use the term “subjective probability” as a
shorthand for this psychological and social process of certitude determination partly because
some well-respected legal academics on whom I rely use the term, see infra text
accompanying notes 211–243 (discussing especially the work of Charles Yablon), and partly
because the term offers an effective contrast to the objective probability idea that some
commentators wrongly assume must control. Importantly, however, as I will explain,
nothing in my approach excludes the use of objective probability data where it is available.
Indeed, it may sometimes be essential to making rational inferences of certitude, that is,
subjective probability judgments as here defined.
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II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ABA’S THIRD-PARTY RECORDS STANDARDS
The rise of the Internet has led to a dramatic increase in the sheer
number of records documenting personal information.32 More importantly,
however, that information can be easily collected in a single location and
analyzed in a fashion presenting previously unparalleled threats to
privacy.33 Indeed, in the private sector, data aggregators are paid to compile
“digital dossiers” presenting an entire portrait of a person’s life.34 Other
technological developments, such as cell phone cameras, radio-frequency
identification devices, public surveillance cameras in stores and on public
streets, and electronic voice messaging expand the array of personal
information that can be included in a dossier.35 Because privacy is itself
best understood as control over information about ourselves, this loss of
control risks undermining the many values that privacy is meant to serve.36
In particular, awareness of the risk of observation can promote social
conformity, chill dissent, discourage creativity, weaken intimate
relationships, and breach the personal boundaries that define personhood.37
Although the private sector poses a danger to privacy interests, the
government poses a unique danger. As the Department of Defense
Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC) explained in the
context of data mining, “only the government exercises the power to
compel disclosure of information and to impose civil and criminal penalties
for noncompliance. Only the government collects and uses information free
from market competition and consumer preferences.”38 Indeed, continued
TAPAC, “[w]hen dealing with the government, individuals have no
opportunity to express their expectations of privacy by choosing to do
32

See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 5, at 3–4.
See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248
(2008) (“But with digitization, not only can recorded information be retained indefinitely at
little cost, but also the information held by different merchants, insurers, and government
agencies can readily be pooled, opening the way to assembling all the recorded information
concerning an individual in a single digital file that can easily be retrieved and searched.”).
34 See MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 1 (2007) (discussing data aggregators); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2, 9 (2004) (defining
“digital dossiers”).
35 See MILLS, supra note 2, at 29–34, 72–74, 148–49.
36 See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 131 (2002)
(defining privacy).
37 See MILLS, supra note 2, at 26–27; Benjamin J. Goold, Surveillance and the Political
Value of Privacy, 1 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 3, 4–5 (2009); Taslitz, supra note 36, at 152–80.
38 TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM: REPORT OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 24 (2004),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060208tapac.pdf.
33
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business elsewhere or by not engaging in transactions at all.”39 Legal
scholar Jed Rubenfeld acknowledges that government can and should have
special rights to access private information as necessary to serve its function
as law enforcer.40 But that does not mean that there should not be
significant limitations on when and how the state invades our lives. To the
contrary, “precisely because the state’s law enforcement power gives it a
license to intrude into our homes and lives in ways that private parties
cannot, the state poses dangers to a free citizenry that private parties do
not.”41
Yet constitutional controls on the state are nonexistent when the state
seeks private information held in the hands of third parties.42 As noted
earlier, this is so because of the “third-party doctrine,” holding that the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
does not apply to information in the control of third parties.43 Although the
Court has occasionally suggested limiting this doctrine,44 the doctrine is still
a vibrant one.45 Yet, “[one] would have to be a hermit to be able to function
in our society without voluntarily disclosing a vast amount of personal
information to a vast array of public and private demanders.”46 Disclosure
is thus not truly “consensual” in any common understanding of that word.47
Third parties consequently hold records of our medical history,
psychological condition, physical location, financial transactions, library
visits, bookstore purchases, political activities, gifts, and media
preferences.48 When the state seeks access to this mother lode of personal

39

Id.
See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 118 (2008).
41 Id.
42 See supra text accompanying note 1.
43 See supra text accompanying note 1.
44 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010) (noting in dicta,
despite finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the government’s surveillance of an
employee’s text messages in the specific case, that “[t]he Court must proceed with care” in
exploring the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technologies and noting the
importance of new social norms spurred to evolve by these technologies).
45 See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.
46 Posner, supra note 33, at 248.
47 See id. at 247 (observing that, although “[a] far greater amount of personal information
is revealed voluntarily than involuntarily,” such disclosure is not truly consensual because it
is necessary “[t]o get a good job, to get health and life insurance,” and to get other aspects of
personal health and welfare); cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 17–18 (2013) (discussing how boilerplate
language, especially as used on the Internet, involves neither true knowledge nor true choice,
and thus, not true consent when “agreeing” to contract terms).
48 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS § 25-3.1 (2012).
40
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information, the Constitution is largely silent.
Law reformers, many citizens, scholars, and professional activists have
thus agitated for change.49 Legislation is the only practical legal means
available to provide protection where the Constitution does not. Some
states and the federal government have occasionally legislated to address
similar problems.50 But there are many holes in this regulatory network.51
The ABA sought to assist in filling those holes by adopting its Access to
Third Party Records Standards. The Standards thus reject the third-party
doctrine and address what level of protection against privacy’s invasion by
governmental access to third-party (largely electronic) records should be
permitted.
The Standards create a sliding scale of protection based upon the
privacy level of the information sought. Records are therefore divided into
those that are “highly private,” “moderately private,” “minimally private,”
and “unprotected” based upon the respective degrees of privacy that a
person has in the records held by institutional third parties (the Standards do
not apply to records held by individuals).52 The degree of privacy
protection is determined by weighing four factors, specifically, the degrees
to which the transfer of such information is: (1) “reasonably necessary to
participate meaningfully in society or commerce” or to achieve socially
beneficial goals (such as freedoms of speech and association); (2) personal;
(3) accessible to nongovernment persons other than the institutional third
party; and (4) capable of access and dissemination to others under existing
law.53 An “escape clause” permits legislatures to lower the degree of
protection dictated by privacy concerns if that level of protection would
unduly interfere with effective enforcement of the criminal law.54
The many types of protections range from notice to the relevant
persons (those whose privacy is invaded) once items are searched or seized;
limitations on who may have access to the records and how, how long, and
where they will be maintained; redaction; accountability mechanisms;55 and
limitations on the uses to be made of the evidence collected.56 But the
49

See supra text accompanying note 16.
See supra text accompanying notes 10, 15.
51 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 175–76.
52 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS §§ 25-2.1, 25-4.1, 25-4.2.
53 See id. § 25-4.1.
54 See id. § 25-4.2(b).
55 For example, periodic review, public reporting, civil penalties, and evidentiary
exclusion are suggested as ways that individual jurisdictions might choose to ensure that law
enforcement is accountable for complying with the Standards’ mandates. See id. § 25-7.1.
56 See id. § 25-5.5 (redaction), § 25-5.7 (notice), §25-6.1 (retention and maintenance),
§ 25-7.1 (accountability).
50
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protections at issue in this Article are those limiting government access to
the records in the first place. Access is permitted by a search warrant based
upon probable cause for highly protected information, a court order based
upon reasonable suspicion for moderately protected information, or a
subpoena based upon a law enforcement certification of relevance for
minimally protected information.57 Even unprotected information can be
sought, however, only for a “legitimate law enforcement purpose.”58
Exigent circumstances and “true” consent can override some of these
statutory protections.59
By providing protection where the Constitution does not and by
potentially expanding limited existing statutory protections, the Standards
incurred the ire of the members of law enforcement on the drafting
committee.60 In a dissenting report, these members put the point this way:
[Under] the Guidelines[,] . . . records that fall into the “highly private” category
require the highest justification (e.g., a search warrant) to obtain, while “minimally
private” records may be obtained with less justification (e.g., a subpoena). While this
[approach] . . . may have some surface appeal, there is no logical or practical necessity
for it. The total level of privacy protection that a law accords to a particular category
of records is controlled not just by the level of proof required in order to obtain a
record but also by the whole system of other safeguards on government disclosure or
abuse. Indeed, the Guidelines lay out a menu of such options, from customer
notification requirements, to restrictions on the use and disclosure of the record by the
official, to civil suits against officials who misuse the record. It would be perfectly
appropriate for a lawmaker . . . , instead of imposing a high restriction on access with
no subsequent safeguards (e.g., a search warrant), . . . [to] require only a low threshold
for government access, but require that the official not disclose it to anyone else
except under very stringent, court supervised conditions (e.g., a grand jury
subpoena).61

This paragraph of course paints a false dichotomy: restricting access or
restricting use after the information is obtained. But both are feasible, and
the Standards provide both such protections.62 Moreover, if no limitations
are placed on information access, law enforcement’s incentive is to collect

57

See id. § 25-4.2.
See id. § 25-5.3(d).
59 See id. § 25-5.1.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 11–13.
61 Dissenting Report, supra note 11, at 15–16.
62 Compare CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD
PARTY RECORDS §§ 25-5.1–25-5.2 (requiring, respectively, true consent or some level of
justification, such as probable cause, to gain access to records held by third parties), with id.
§§ 25-6.1–25-6.2 (requiring law enforcement to protect seized records from access by
unauthorized persons or entities, limiting access generally only to those involved in or
necessary to the investigation, and frequently creating audit logs and routine recorddestruction schedules where records are no longer needed).
58
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as much information as possible, then worry about what to do with it later,
rather than minimizing privacy invasion. Furthermore, whether postevidence-collection limitations have been complied with is information
generally held in law enforcement’s hands, and thus is harder to obtain,
creating obstacles to effective accountability.
Nevertheless, these dissenters saw access restrictions as unwarranted
by privacy concerns. They also argued that citizens have an obligation to
assist law enforcement in criminal investigations and that these higher
justification standards would unduly impede or, at the very least, slow or
render costly, important criminal investigations.63 Indeed, they would end
many investigations, leaving crimes unsolved and wrongdoers unpunished,
which would have a broad impact in combating identity theft, organized
crime, theft of trade secrets, and child abuse, among other offenses.64 Law
enforcement needs no such regulation because it “represents the community
and is accountable through elected leaders. With rare exceptions, law
enforcement officers act in the public interest to protect public safety, fight
crime, or for other legitimate purposes.”65
Nowhere in the dissenters’ analysis is there a discussion of just what
each justification standard means, how or why it would unduly impede law
enforcement, or what legitimate and important societal goals these access
requirements would serve.66 Law enforcement is to be trusted, political
safeguards always work, and privacy is of insufficient concern to ever reject
its bowing to law enforcement needs. Thus we have two diametrically
opposed critiques of the justification standards: the dissenters’ views that
they are unnecessary, destructive, and harsh, and Ohm’s view that they are
useless because they provide no meaningful protections.
III. THE MEANING AND SOCIAL VALUE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND
REASONABLE SUSPICION
Understanding why justification requirements like probable cause and
reasonable suspicion are neither unduly burdensome to law enforcement nor
worthless—indeed, to the contrary, serve important social goals—in the
area of government access to third-party records requires a deeper
understanding of just what these standards are. Part III addresses two key
aspects of what defines probable cause and reasonable suspicion, as
properly understood: the quantitative element, that is, what degree of proof
is required (for example, 30%, 50%, or some greater probability) that a
63
64
65
66

See Dissenting Report, supra note 11, at 15–16.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 1–23.
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defendant has committed a crime or that evidence of crime will be found in
a particular location, and the qualitative element, meaning the requirement
that law enforcement and judges rely on complete, trustworthy information.
Addressing the first question requires initially, however, understanding why
we have standards of proof in the first place. Discussing that point is
therefore where Part III begins.
A. THE QUANTITATIVE ELEMENT: STANDARDS OF PROOF

1. Why Do We Have Standards of Proof?
Standards of proof, such as preponderance of evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt, serve several social functions. First, neither the
government nor private persons acting in its name (jurors) may interfere
with individual or group interests absent justification.67 The substance of
the justification varies with the particular legal claim (for example, contract,
torts, murder, rape), but the standard of proof ensures that some justification
must be offered. In particular, this justification must partly be in the form
of proving facts demonstrating that the state’s right to impose a cost on an
individual or group is triggered.68 In a civil contract claim, the facts must
show that an agreement supported by consideration existed and was
breached, causing damages.69 Only then may the state compel the
defendant to pay those damages. In a first-degree capital murder case, the
facts must show that the defendant, and no one else, killed the victim, and
that the defendant did so willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.70
Only then may the state consider imposing the death penalty. These facts,
assessed in light of the relevant legal categories, justify the state’s cost67

Cf. BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES 57 (2004)
(“Establishing guilt involves a fact-finding process that aims to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged.”) (emphases added). Convicting an alleged criminal thus requires proving,
via evidence, and with a high level of confidence, that the defendant engaged in conduct
with a specified mental state causing specified social harms stated in statutory elements. The
state has no justification for imposing imprisonment or other costs on a person unless the
requisite elements are properly proven. Other standards of proof lower the degree of
justification required but operate in a similar fashion.
68 See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY 68–74 (2006) (describing standards of proof as methods for apportioning the
distribution of types of risks of error—e.g., the distribution of the risks of acquitting the
guilty and convicting the innocent—and arguing that how to proportion those risks turns on
the relative costs imposed on the individual if the standard is met, with higher costs requiring
a lower risk of false positives (such as convicting the innocent) relative to false negatives
(such as acquitting the guilty)).
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
70 See ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL LAW 129–30 (2008).
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imposing actions.
Second, these justifications must be made to someone. That someone
may be a judge or a jury.71 Since the justification must be made to another
to a sufficient degree to persuade them to invoke the state’s power, the
standard of proof ensures accountability. As much empirical evidence
demonstrates, a person’s mere knowledge that she must be accountable to
another reduces the likelihood that her actions embody error.72
Accountability can occur only if the person explains her actions to a
reviewing individual or body.73 Explanation requires articulation, and
articulation encourages self-assessment (e.g., have I done all that I need to
do to make a persuasive case before I stand before others to be judged?) and
permits error correction by the reviewer.74 Standards of proof thus force
social actors verbally to explain their choices and the reasoning underlying
them. Those explanations must address the evidence that supports the
factual claims that trigger the legal categories permitting the state to use or
threaten to use force to compel obedience to its dictates.75
Third, the level of the standard of proof expresses important societal
values.76 If the individual or group interest invaded is considered of
moderate social importance or the degree of invasion of that interest is
likewise seen as moderate, then the lower preponderance standard of proof

71

See LAUDAN, supra note 68, at 16 (noting that judge or jury must be persuaded to
convict in a criminal case).
72 See Taslitz, Cognitive Obstacles, supra note 29, at 12, 31–32, 64–66.
73 See id. at 64–67.
74 See id. Even jurors face the task of articulating reasons for their decisions to other
jurors. See Jeffrey Abramson, Jury Deliberation: Fair and Foul, in JURY ETHICS: JUROR
CONDUCT AND JURY DYNAMICS 181, 193 (John Kleinig & James P. Levine eds., 2006)
(“[T]he ideal of the cross-sectional jury seeks to mire jury deliberation in the full-bodied life
of the community, recruiting jurors from all walks of life precisely so that the jury room will
echo with remarks about what a police officer’s word is worth to a black man or what
attention a woman does and does not invite by the clothes she wears or the hours she
keeps.”); DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 154, 156–
57 (2012) (describing the constant conversation, disagreement, and even conflict that jurors
engage in when trying to persuade one another to reach a common verdict).
75 See Ligon v. City of New York, Nos. 12 Civ. 2274(SAS), 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013
WL 227654, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (presenting findings of fact in a Fourth
Amendment civil case, illustrating a court’s explanation of why the evidence supporting the
plaintiff’s factual claims triggered the legal categories involved in issuing a preliminary
injunction to halt purportedly unreasonable searches and seizures); DEVINE, supra note 74, at
163 (“[G]ood studies have been done, and they show that deliberation content can and does
influence jury decisions.”); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520 (1991) (describing how
jurors use stories to fit the facts into a legal category).
76 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021 (1996) (discussing the messages that law sends and their social function).
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suffices.77 But if the interest invaded is seen as highly important or its
degree of invasion as extreme, the higher beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is required. Tort injuries, such as negligence in maintaining a
sidewalk, are generally viewed as being visited upon individuals by
individuals and implicating the public only indirectly.78 But planned
murder is understood as injuring public values as directly as individual
security, values fundamental to how we define the social order.79 Partly for
this reason, tort suits require proof of the relevant facts only by a
preponderance; criminal cases require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.80
Note that “facts” have a theoretically objective component (e.g., it is either
true or false that John shot George) but also often involve value judgments,
such as whether a killing reflected a “depraved heart” (second-degree
murder) or reasonable provocation into the “heat of passion”
(manslaughter).81 Depravity is not an objective question in the same way as
is who hit whom. The extent to which the values defining “depravity” are
seen as especially important or not is partly reflected in the level of the
standard of proof.82 Likewise, the extent to which the values defining
probable cause and reasonable suspicion are seen as especially important or
not under the Fourth Amendment should also be reflected in the level of the
standard of proof required.
Fourth, because we value some things more than others, our tolerance
for error in finding the facts and in applying the law varies.83 The
77

This communicative grading is akin to that done in assigning a hierarchy of
punishments to various criminal offenses: the most serious offenses receive the highest
punishments, the less serious ones lesser punishments. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The
Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 485 (2006); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society:
Law’s Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS 305, 309, 334–38
(2001) [hereinafter Taslitz, Civil Society].
78 See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 77, at 346–47.
79 See id. at 346–49.
80 See LAUDAN, supra note 68, at 66–74 (arguing that empirical research should be
undertaken to determine the social value that the public places on punishing crime versus
imposing tort liability to determine how to set the level of the standard of proof in civil and
criminal cases, but favoring a variety of proof standards for different wrongs rather than, for
example, the uniform beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases).
81 See PODGOR ET AL., supra note 70, at 136–38, 147 (defining depraved-heart murder
and heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter); Taslitz, Cognitive Obstacles, supra note 29, at
9–10, 66–67 (illustrating the role of values in probable cause factfinding); Taslitz,
Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 170 (discussing the difference between “raw” and
normative facts).
82 See LAUDAN, supra note 68, at 66–76 (discussing the link between values and
standards of proof).
83 See Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction: A
Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European Law, 33
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preponderance standard tolerates a fairly significant risk of error; the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard permits much less of a risk.84
There are, therefore, good reasons to guide important decisions
implicating state power by establishing a specific standard of proof.85
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion authorize the state to use force
against its citizens and thus likewise should require the articulation of an
appropriate correlative standard of proof. Yet the United States Supreme
Court has never announced one, much less two (in theory, one standard
could govern probable cause, another reasonable suspicion). The Court has
repeatedly said that probable cause cannot be quantified, and it has implied
the same to be true of reasonable suspicion.86 In defining these terms—and
it always does so vaguely—not once has it recited the relevant respective
standard of proof.87 Indeed, the outcomes of the Court’s decisions suggest
that the standard, if there is one, is elusive and ever-shifting, thus being no
standard at all.88 In addressing the logic of this no-standard-of-proof
VT. L. REV. 435, 444 (2009) (“Likewise, in criminal law, guilt must be proven ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ The law focuses on alpha errors [false positives] and requires them to be
very rare. By implication, ‘preponderance of the evidence’ requires much less certainty.
The legal order tolerates a substantially higher error rate.”).
84 See id.
85 Another reason articulated by economists is that the standard of proof affects
incentives, thus altering social welfare. As a simple example, if a standard of proof is so
high that many offenders against the law in civil actions are not held liable, that is in effect
legalizing their behavior. Freed of civil liability, the behavior that society seeks to deter
increases. The relative costs of lowering the standard of proof must be weighed against the
increased deterrent effect to determine the optimal standard. See generally Louis Kaplow,
Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012) (articulating one such theory). This summary
greatly oversimplifies the economic argument, but it expresses its essence. I may here touch
on the general idea that standards of proof can affect policing behavior, but a thorough
theoretical and empirical economic analysis of the social welfare effects of choosing a
particular standard of proof for the probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations
is beyond this Article’s scope. The economic theory also apparently assumes an objective
theory of probability that I do not think fully describes judicial decisionmaking, see infra
text accompanying notes 244–255, and the exact nature of police response to varying the
standard of proof in suppression hearings or warrant applications is not something that I
think can be determined without serious empirical investigation.
86 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause
standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (“Our cases have recognized that the concept of
reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract.”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696
(1996) (cautioning that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are not “finely-tuned
standards”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 188–93, 357–
63 (4th ed. 2010) (summarizing case law).
88 See Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE POLITICAL
HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 131, 131
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position below—a position the Court never clearly justifies—I focus
primarily on probable cause as my example, then return to reasonable
suspicion to see whether the same analysis should govern both concepts.
2. The Argument Against Having a Standard of Proof for Probable Cause
To my knowledge, the only academic to have defended at any length
the Court’s no-standard-of-proof position for probable cause is Orin Kerr.
Kerr’s argument is that adopting a standard of proof for probable cause will
replace judges’ intuitive understanding of the importance of missing
evidence—evidence not mentioned by the police—in establishing probable
cause, leading judges to overvalue weak evidence that such cause exists.89
His argument that current procedures do not maximize the amount of
evidence showing both the strengths and weaknesses of the case for
probable cause is right on the money. But his argument that articulating a
standard of proof will make things worse and is otherwise undesirable is
wrong.
Probable cause affidavits, Kerr explains, recite “the officer’s
affirmative reasons to think probable cause exists.”90 But these same
affidavits fail to mention what unsuccessful investigative efforts by the
police were made.91 Nor do the affidavits mention what investigative steps
they chose not to take and why.92 Yet these two pieces of information are
critical in determining the probabilities of a suspect’s guilt or of the
existence and location of damning evidence.93 The first of these evidentiary
puzzle pieces matters because failed efforts to find evidence of guilt that
should have succeeded were the suspect in fact guilty constitute exculpatory
evidence.94 If an accused child murderer passes a polygraph test (assuming
(Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012) (describing the Court’s definition of probable cause, and
especially of the associated standard of proof, as “no explanation at all, of course”).
89 See id. at 131–33.
90 See id. at 132. For an illustration of the kinds of assertions made in probable cause
affidavits, see TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 87, at 216–18, 241–43.
91 See Kerr, supra note 88, at 132–33.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 The Court does require the prosecution to produce to the defense all material
exculpatory evidence that may lead to an acquittal at trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963). But there is no analogous obligation requiring the state to produce
exculpatory evidence to the magistrate when filing a warrant application or to defense
counsel before or during a suppression hearing. The closest equivalent—and it is not very
close—is the rule of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which permits invalidating a
search warrant that intentionally or recklessly misrepresents facts without which probable
cause would not have existed. Id. at 156. Presumably this rule would extend to exclusions
of exculpatory evidence but only where the missing evidence was so important that it alone
would have demonstrated probable cause’s absence. See Kerr, supra note 88, at 134.
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that the polygraph is sufficiently reliable); has an airtight alibi offered by
impeccable, disinterested witnesses who successfully stand up to police
probing; and left no physical evidence at the crime scene that could be
linked to him where such evidence would be expected given the particular
facts of the case, the probabilities of the suspect’s guilt are significantly
reduced.95 A judge hearing only evidence of guilt but unaware of this
exculpatory evidence will potentially be misled. The second piece of the
evidentiary puzzle matters because police not trying investigative
techniques normally expected of them, and offering no good reason for their
failure, raises suspicion that they lack subjective good faith.96 For example,
if testable DNA evidence was available and they chose not to test it, this
suggests that they had reason to fear it would exculpate the defendant.
Consequently, they avoided the test. This bad faith calls into question their
motives, objectivity, and competency, thus raising reasons to distrust their
conclusion that probable cause of guilt exists.
Kerr offers the following example to make his point.97 Assume that an
empirical study reveals that there is a 60% chance that any room in a
college dormitory contains drugs. Assume further that an excellent drugsniffing machine, the Potdetector 9000, which is almost 100% accurate,
exists. The machine need merely sniff the air outside a dorm room and thus
does not require any search to react to the presence of drugs.98 The police
further conducted an undercover investigation implicating half the dorm
rooms in drug possession.99 Student A’s dorm room was not so implicated.
The police submit an affidavit mentioning only the 60% figure and its

Moreover, the burden of proving fraud or recklessness rests with the defendant, see TASLITZ
ET AL., supra note 87, at 228, who rarely will be aware at this early stage of the litigation, if
ever, of the police’s possession of exculpatory evidence. See Kerr, supra note 88, at 134.
95 The example is mine.
96 See Kerr, supra note 88, at 138.
97 See id. at 135–37. I have changed Kerr’s example here only slightly, such as giving
the fictional student the name “Student A,” where I felt that it would add clarity to my
exposition.
98 Cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding that a drug dog’s sniff of a
lawfully seized car during a routine traffic stop did not constitute a search because the dog
reacts solely to contraband); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (reaching a
similar holding for a canine drug sniff of luggage in a public place). But see Florida v.
Jardines, No. 11-564, slip op. at 8–10 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013) (holding that police using a drugsniffing dog at the entrance to a private home does implicate the Fourth Amendment);
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013) (finding reliability of a drug-sniffing dog
relatively easy to establish via a flexible, commonsense test).
99 Undercover investigations also do not ordinarily implicate the Fourth Amendment.
See generally United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963).
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empirical bases to justify searching the room of Student A for drugs. The
police never mention that they failed to use the Potdetector 9000. Nor did
they mention the undercover investigation. How would a judge react?
Kerr argues that in practice the judge’s intuitions will lead her to deny
probable cause.100 The 60% likelihood of drugs is the chance of
discovering them by randomly selecting a room. But the judge knows that
police do not randomly select rooms.101 Perhaps this is because they have
limited resources for repeated trial and error in this fashion; perhaps it is
because they know judges will not tolerate such random action. Whatever
the explanation, the judge will therefore want the backstory explaining why
the police would think that this particular room fits in the 60% where drugs
would be found.102 Without knowing why the police chose to submit only
generalized probability evidence, the judge is troubled, even suspicious of
the police actions.103 The police must be hiding something. That
something may include their refusal to use the Potdetector 9000—the use of
which could have conclusively ruled Student A’s guilt in or out. The other
hidden item of evidence, of course, is the undercover investigation that did
not implicate Student A’s room.
But Kerr next makes a startling assertion: the judge’s intuitions will
fail if she is given a standard of proof, specifically 47%, to guide the
probable cause determination.104 Kerr argues two cognitive biases will
thereby be brought into play: the representativeness heuristic and
anchoring.105 The representativeness heuristic, as Kerr defines it, is the idea
that individuals “measure probability by reference to data that seem to
resemble the probability to be estimated.”106 Kerr leaves out in his
100

See Kerr, supra note 88, at 137.
See id.
102 See id. at 138.
103 See id.; cf. Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical
Versus Concrete Harms, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69 (2010) (discussing generally
the strengths and weaknesses of the human preference for evidence of specific harms done to
concrete individuals over statistical likelihood of harms).
104 See Kerr, supra note 88, at 141. Kerr apparently derived his 47% illustrative figure
from a 1980s survey of federal judges, which found a broad range of quantitative estimates
of probable cause (10%–90%) but averaging 44.52% certainty. See C.M.A. McCauliff,
Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327–28 (1982). But see Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry:
A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1082–
85 (1998) (quantifying the probable cause standard of proof at 50%).
105 See Kerr, supra note 88, at 139–40.
106 Id. at 139; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84, 84–85
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]
(explaining the representativeness heuristic). Rephrased, we make probability judgments
101
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definition the current understanding that the reason why some information
is viewed as “representative” is often because it “fit[s] a stereotype or [is
seen as] diagnostic of group membership.”107
The frequency of
representative events is likely to be overestimated, indeed viewed as more
frequent than other events of which the representative one is a subset—a
logical impossibility.108 For example, subjects given a description of
“Linda” as “31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright”; having
majored in philosophy; and, as a student, having been concerned with
discrimination and social justice to the point of participating in antinuclear
demonstrations, think it more likely that Linda is a feminist activist bank
teller than that she is simply a bank teller.109 But that cannot logically be
true because feminist bank tellers are a subset of all bank tellers (unless we
assume that every bank teller is by definition a feminist). Because the
description of Linda most closely fits that of cultural stereotypes of
feminists, the subjects incorrectly assumed that Linda was a feminist bank
teller.110
Anchoring is the idea that people will judge probabilities, indeed, that
they will make a numerical estimate in a particular case, by adjusting the
probabilities up or down based upon a given starting point.111 For example,
whoever makes the first offer in a negotiation may have an advantage
because it anchors the opponent’s estimates of the most likely result.112
Anchoring effects are observed even if uninformative numbers are used,
such as estimates of the number of countries in the United Nations being
influenced by first being told the number of doctors in a local phone
based on the resemblance of one thing to another rather than its likelihood or frequency.
More formally stated, the representativeness heuristic means that “probability judgments (the
likelihood that X is a Y) are mediated by assessments of resemblance (the degree to which X
‘looks like’ a Y).” Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 49–50 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
107 MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE 23 (2011).
108 See id.
This logical error, called the “conjunction fallacy,” results from the
representativeness heuristic but is not the heuristic itself. See Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability
Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 293 (1983). The term “conjunction fallacy” is used
because the joint or conjunctive probability of two events occurring is always less than or
equal to the probability of only one of those events occurring. See Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 106, at 98.
109 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 106, at 92–93.
110 See id. at 96.
111 See PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 216, 267–72,
472–73, 519 (2010) (explaining the anchoring heuristic and how it can sometimes interfere
with optimal human reasoning).
112 See id. at 268–69.
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book.113
Kerr argues without explanation that the 60% likelihood of drugs
being found in a dorm room in his example seems representative of the
probability (probable cause) being calculated.114 That 60% will act as an
anchor in making the probable cause judgment. The judge will thus look to
see if there is any reason to lower the probability to below the 47% marker
in this case. But, having only the 60% figure, there is no such reason, so
the judge will find probable cause.115 Kerr asserts this point as self-evident,
never explaining why the judge will lose her skepticism about missing
evidence linking the generalized probability to the specific suspect.116
Now Kerr varies the hypothetical.117 Remember that the police
113

See KELMAN, supra note 107, at 23.
How does a 60% likelihood of drugs in a dorm room “resemble” probable cause that
there are drugs in a dorm room? Perhaps it is that both terms involve probability and, more
specifically, the probability of drugs being found in a specific location. That seems
plausible. But there are also no overt stereotypes involved, like that of how “feminists”
behave in the Linda example above. See supra text accompanying notes 108–114. Nor are
there particularly vivid facts (being told simply that an empirical study led to the 60% figure
is hardly an engaging image) that would make the 60% figure most “available” to memory,
leading subjects to focus on the 60% more than on any other information. See BREST &
KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 51 (describing the “availability heuristic”); id. at 271 (arguing
that anchoring—the power of the first number presented to “pull” estimates of an event
toward that number, a phenomenon discussed infra—“may increase the availability of
features that the anchor and the target—e.g., the number to be determined—hold in common,
selectively activating information about the target that is consistent with the anchor (while
not activating other information)”). My point is this: even if the representativeness or
availability heuristics are triggered, there are reasons to believe that that trigger is less
powerful than may be true in other instances. That matters because of the ability to reduce
or eliminate the effect of many biases by varying situational and informational factors, as is
discussed below. See, e.g., Barbara Mellers et al., Do Frequency Representations Eliminate
Conjunction Effects?: An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 269
(2001).
115 See Kerr, supra note 88, at 140–41.
116 Kerr relies on the infamous “blue bus” example crafted by empirical researchers
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, to make this point. See id. at 139–40; Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 12 OR. RES. INST. BULL. 1.
(1972). Without going through the details of that example, it is worth noting that Kerr saw
the subjects’ error in estimating probability judgments there as due to their “focusing” on a
specific probability number they were given. It is important to note several points here,
however: first, although it illustrates error resulting from the representativeness heuristic,
simple changes in how data is presented can correct such errors, see infra text accompanying
note 127; second, the experiment involved only generalized probability statements rather
than the additional, more concrete, individualized evidence that the probable cause
determination requires, see Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 145; and
third, Kahneman and Tversky themselves saw awareness of the representativeness and other
heuristics as but cautions and as most useful in making subjective, rather than objective,
probability judgments. See infra text accompanying notes 213–214.
117 See Kerr, supra note 88, at 141–43.
114
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conducted an undercover investigation implicating half the rooms in drugs,
Suspect A’s room not being in that half. Assume now a 90% likelihood that
all rooms implicated in drugs in fact contained drugs. Ignore the
Potdetector 9000 possibility for these purposes. Once we know that
Suspect A’s room was not in the 50% of the rooms linked to drugs, when
combined with the empirical study finding a 60% likelihood of all the
rooms having drugs, the new probability of drugs in the nonimplicated
rooms, like Student A’s, is 30%, says Kerr, well below the 47% standard of
proof for probable cause. (I am putting aside whether Kerr’s probability
analysis is correct; he does not explain it, and my goal here is simply to
recount his argument.) If the judge knew this information, the judge would
unquestionably not find probable cause. But the existence of a 47%
standard of proof has robbed this judge of her skepticism about potential
missing evidence. She will find probable cause, though she is radically
wrong.
Understanding the weaknesses in the latter portion of Kerr’s argument
(about the elimination of judicial skepticism) and the incompleteness of his
argument about missing evidence sheds much light on the value of having a
standard of proof in the probable cause determination.118 It is that task to
which this Article next turns.
3. The Flaws in Kerr’s Argument Against Having a Probable Cause
Standard of Proof
i.

Objective Probability Data Relevant to Probable Cause Rarely Exists

As noted above, Kerr relies for his point on an extended example—the
dorm room drug search—in which an empirical study creates a high,
objective, generalized probability that drugs will be found in a randomly
selected dorm room. Yet it is likely to be the rare case that such
generalized, objective probability data is available,119 though, as is
118 One well-known evidence scholar has indeed argued that the essential purpose of
having a standard of proof is to encourage parties to produce evidence that would otherwise
be missing from the factfinder’s awareness. See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness
and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 621 (1998).
119 Not one United States Supreme Court case addresses generalized probability data in
the area of probable cause. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 87, at 188–93. Nor, except as
noted below, is there much academic literature on the point, nor have I ever seen a case
raising it in bar and law reform activities or among the many alumni in criminal practice
with whom I stay in touch. There has been writing on group-based searches, primarily either
in the administrative or special needs search areas—“dragnets” (an umbrella term for groupbased searches) or data mining and its cousins—none of which concern me here. See id. at
416–66 (concerning administrative and special needs searches); Christopher Slobogin,
Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110–24 (2010) (discussing
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addressed shortly, that may change somewhat in the future.120 Absent such
data, it is hard to see how a specific number can exist to serve as an anchor.
ii. The Standard of Proof, Rather than the Probability Data, Is More Likely
to Serve as an Anchor
Nor is it clear why the standard of proof, 47% in his example, would
not serve as the anchor rather than the 60% figure.121 The first figure to
Supreme Court cases involving “dragnet” searches). These search categories do involve
implicit or explicit objective probability judgments, but my focus in this piece is entirely on
searches targeted at specific individuals or locations. In that area of focus, there is little
evidence that numerical, generalized objective probability data, outside of crime mapping
and its fellow traveler, discussed below, plays much of a role.
120 See infra text accompanying notes 309–315. Erica Goldberg, in a recent piece, argues
that much greater effort should be made by the police in the future to collect a far wider
range of mathematical data relevant to police search and seizure practices than is currently
the case. See Erica Rachel Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause
Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 44–45), available at
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works/34/.
121 One reader of a draft of this Article commented that Kerr might argue that the 60%
figure is a “factual anchor,” one based on case-specific facts; in Kerr’s hypothetical, the
conducting of an empirical study of the likelihood of drugs being found in a randomly
selected dorm room at a particular college. The 47% standard of proof, on the other hand, is
the same in every case, thus less likely to be chosen as an anchor in a particular case. I am
not sure why this should be so. Many studies of the anchoring phenomenon have involved
completely abstract, obviously untrustworthy, even irrelevant numbers; indeed anchoring
occurs, such as in estimating the length of the Mississippi River, even by being exposed to a
drawing of long rather than short lines. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 270.
Furthermore, “anchors that we encountered along the way and were swayed by remain with
us long after the initial decision itself.” DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 36 (2008). Thus, “our first decisions resonate
over a long sequence of decisions.” Id. Accordingly, “[f]irst impressions are important,
whether they involve remembering that our first DVD player cost much more than such
players cost today (and realizing that, in comparison, the current prices are a steal) or
remembering that gas was once a dollar a gallon, which makes every trip to the gas station a
painful experience.” Id. If, as I argue here, the 47%, not the 60% figure, creates the first
impression, then there is no reason why anchoring alone should be dominated by the latter
rather than the former number. Moreover, although the 60% figure is more case-specific
than the posited ever-constant 47% standard of proof, both quantities are quite abstract,
neither addressing in the number alone individualized or vivid information about a specific
dorm room or person. There is additionally some empirical data suggesting that merely
presenting abstract or mathematical data to laypersons is less persuasive than case-specific
descriptions of persons and events. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE
COURTROOM 133 (1999) (“[T]he impact of such general [social science expert] background
testimony, while significant, is quite limited next to testimony that links general principles to
the case before the court.”); David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial
Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1,
16 (1988) (“[O]ur results . . . suggest, contrary to Tribe’s (1971a) assertion, that an expert's
Bayesian formulation will not overwhelm the average trier of fact. Courts, it seems, should
be less concerned with jurors being overwhelmed by the complexity of statistical techniques
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which judges will be exposed, and the one with which they will be most
familiar, is the 47% standard of proof for probable cause, if that standard
were widely adopted. If so, a judge should instead be asking what reason is
there to believe she should move up in this case from that 47% rather than
down from the 60% figure—precisely the opposite of Kerr’s analysis.122
Yet Kerr argues that, absent persuasive case-specific evidence of this sort, a
judge is unlikely to depart sufficiently from her anchor.123
Anchoring, especially in conditions of uncertainty, is a robust
phenomenon, resisting efforts to combat it.124 But initial anchors have far
stronger effects than later ones.125 Anchors may simply be the first figure to
which a decisionmaker is exposed.126 Barring countervailing phenomena,
there is thus good reason to believe that the 47%, not the 60%, figure will
indeed serve as the anchor. Importantly, anchors do not prevent adjustment
in the face of other evidence. But adjustment may not be as large as the
evidence suggests.127 If this is so, however, judges may undervalue
evidence of probable guilt (evidence above the 47% figure), rather than
overvaluing it as Kerr claims.
Of course, they may overvalue weak evidence of guilt (under the 47%
mark), too, if given a standard of proof. There is, however, little empirical

and more concerned with impressing upon jurors the relevance of those techniques.”); David
McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in
Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 741 (1990)
(summarizing much of the research in this area and specifying the conditions under which
statistical evidence is unlikely to unduly influence the jury). Given the relative abstractness
of the 60% figure, I find it hard to see, therefore, why it should have a stronger grip on the
imagination than the 47% figure, especially if the latter is presented earlier and repeatedly.
See DEVINE, supra note 74, at 131–33.
122 See ARIELY, supra note 121, at 31–36 (reviewing research showing that, rather than
“flip-flopping” among new anchors as they are encountered, the first or initial anchor to
which we are exposed lasts for a long time, dominating over other potential anchors).
123 See Kerr, supra note 88, at 140–41.
124 See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 271–72 (noting that anchoring resists
adequate adjustment even when subjects are warned about the phenomenon); RICHARDS J.
HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 152 (1999), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf
(recommending,
while admitting that it has not yet been empirically tested, “ignor[ing] one’s own or others’
earlier judgments and rethink[ing] a problem from scratch” as a way to compensate for the
anchoring heuristic); MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN, THINK TWICE: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
COUNTERINTUITION 22 (2009) (arguing that “[d]eveloping and recognizing a full range of
outcomes is the best protection against the anchoring effect if you are sitting on the other
side of the negotiating table”).
125 See ARIELY, supra note 121, at 31–36.
126 See id.
127 See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 269–71.
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evidence on the point, though the little evidence available does suggest that
warrant-issuing magistrates overvalue information in probable cause
affidavits concerning black suspects relative to white suspects.128 But
subconscious racial bias seems the more likely culprit here because
numerical estimates of suspect guilt were not involved—as they rarely
are.129 Moreover, the risk of judges overvaluing some weak evidence under
rare circumstances is not necessarily preferable to the risks raised by not
having a standard of proof at all.130
128

See Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 101, 105 (2002); Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for
Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project,
36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 230–33 (2000).
129 See sources cited supra note 124.
130 Judges may, of course, overvalue weak evidence even where no numerical estimates
of guilt are involved. Specifically, judges may suffer from the “availability heuristic”—
overestimating probabilities based on the information most easily available to the judges
rather than on a more complete set of information. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at
252–58. Police and judges often deal with the guilty or those for whom there is at least
substantial evidence of guilt. They may, therefore, ignore base rates—the frequency of
criminal guilt in the broader population—leading them to view the available evidence as
more indicative of probable guilt than it really is. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up
Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 942–43 (2006) (arguing that because
judges face vivid individual cases, they may, given the availability heuristic, come to view
the unusual cases before them as common). Laypersons are able to correct for the
availability bias when told to sit as jurors but not when simply asked their opinion—at least
if the available information seems irrelevant to an unbiased interpretation of evidence. See
BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 257. Heightening laypersons’ awareness of the
availability bias’s presence and the reasons for its influence in a specific case also might
loosen the bias’s hold, but that can lead to overcorrection: discounting probability more than
should be the case. See id. at 256. Nevertheless, given the similarity between lay and
judicial reasoning, these findings might suggest that the grip of the availability heuristic on
judges can sometimes be loosened. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778–81 (2001) (finding, in a study of 167 federal magistrates, that
their decisionmaking was affected by five common cognitive illusions—anchoring,
egocentric bias, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and framing—though they
were less influenced by the last two illusions than were laypersons, while also suggesting
that teaching judges to adopt multiple perspectives might help to reduce some of these
illusions’ impact). Ultimately, the empirical research suggests that judges—especially busy
trial judges—reason intuitively much in the way that laypersons do, rather than
deliberatively. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–33 (2007). Nevertheless, training and feedback to judges
(including frequent peer review), allowing them more decisionmaking time, increased use of
scripts and checklists, consistent opinion-writing requirements, and more frequent use of
detailed multifactor tests that remind judges of all relevant factors to consider hold promise
for moving judges toward more deliberative, less biased reasoning. See id. at 33–43; see
also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 207, 220–21 (2006) (suggesting that proper training, not experience, is more
important to reducing judicial cognitive biases). The concept of weight, discussed infra,
which requires judges to be attentive to the completeness and quality of the evidence before
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Maryland v. Pringle131 illustrates the point. There, an officer
conducted a consent search of a vehicle. There were three occupants: the
driver; the defendant, who was in the front passenger seat; and a third party
in the rear seat. The officer found drugs hidden behind an upraised armrest
next to the rear passenger. When no one would confess to possessing the
drugs, the officer arrested all three men. He later released two of them
when the defendant finally confessed. Under Maryland law, all three
occupants could be presumed jointly to possess the drugs only if they were
visible to all occupants.132 These drugs were not. That meant that only one
of the three could legally be treated as the possessor, creating a one-third
likelihood (absent any other evidence) that any one occupant was guilty.133
The Court upheld the defendant’s arrest.134 The only possible explanations
for finding probable cause here were that: (1) the Court ignored Maryland

them, combined with the requirement of accountability (that is, express reasoned
explanation, as with formal opinion writing) implicit in probable cause, see infra notes 347–
391 and accompanying text, can aid in prompting judges to more deliberate thinking in the
probable cause area. Similarly, a specific standard of proof might serve as a reminder that
judges must carefully evaluate the evidence of probable cause for its sufficiency rather than
simply relying on intuition. Furthermore, a more precise understanding of what probable
cause means can provide the checklists, scripts, multifactor considerations, and other
reminders that can aid judges in more deliberative thinking processes. In any event, there is
no reason to believe that these features argued for here will worsen the availability bias, yet,
for the reasons noted, they might help to alleviate it.
131 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
132 See Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1035 (Md. 2002), rev’d, 540 U.S. 366 (2003)
(stating that “even at the probable cause to arrest stage,” police must show that every person
arrested for possession had “‘knowledge’ of the controlled dangerous substance and
‘dominion or control’ over the substance,” such knowledge permissibly being inferred under
Maryland law only if the drugs in a car were fully visible to all occupants).
133 One reader of a draft of this piece thought that there was sufficient evidence that all
three occupants jointly possessed the drugs because the police also found, pursuant to a
“consent search,” $763 in the glove compartment. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371–72. I am
not convinced. Money in a glove compartment may most logically be linked to the driver or
owner of the car. Pringle was neither. Furthermore, the drugs were found behind an
upraised armrest next to a backseat passenger other than Pringle. There is no reason to
believe that Pringle himself, neither owning nor driving the car, nor being near the drugs,
was aware of their presence. Equally importantly, Maryland law forbade that inference in
judging the existence of the elements of the crime. Pringle thus cannot be charged with
knowing that the money in the closed glove compartment was there nor that the drugs were
present in the backseat, much less of being aware of both facts jointly. The Court admittedly
seems to conclude that mere accessibility of the drugs is sufficient to find knowledge of their
presence—again, ignoring Maryland law defining the offense—and that a drug dealer would
be unlikely to admit an innocent person into his car, a highly questionable assumption. See
id. at 373–74. I thus found the state court’s majority opinion on these points far more
persuasive than the United State Supreme Court’s reasoning. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note
87, at 189–95 (articulating a more detailed summary and analysis of Pringle).
134 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368.
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law—which, its precedent says, it may not in determining probable cause
(though it may ignore state law for certain other Fourth Amendment
purposes);135 (2) the Court found probable cause in error given that a onethird likelihood of guilt was lower than their previous precedent ever
suggested was plausible;136 (3) the Court implicitly relied on a standard of
proof but lowered it from previous levels;137 (4) the Court varied the level
of proof for probable cause with the particular circumstances without ever
admitting that it was doing so or explaining what circumstances matter and
why;138 (5) probable cause is a shifting, ill-defined concept, something
creating no effective restraints on government because the Court “knows it
when it sees it.”139 None of these explanations are flattering to Kerr’s nostandard-of-proof-required vision of probable cause. Taken as a whole,
they suggest that absence of a standard of proof gives neither the Court nor
lower courts, nor even the police, helpful guidance. Furthermore, the
ambiguity of the concept makes it particularly subject to subconscious
ideological manipulation, an expression of raw power not justified by any
clear or plausible explanation.140
135 Probable cause means probable cause to believe that a specific offense has been
committed, as defined by the law of the relevant jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ligon v. City of New
York, No. 12 Civ. 2274, 2013 WL 227654, at *3–4 & n.11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013)
(interpreting United States Supreme Court probable cause case law and focusing on whether,
under New York law, police had reasonable suspicion to believe that people stopped outside
of a housing project were committing the crime of trespass—a central question to
determining whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated). Virginia v. Moore, 553
U.S. 164 (2008), is consistent with the analysis in Ligon. Moore arguably held that a police
violation of a state statute prohibiting arrest for a citation-only offense was irrelevant to the
reasonableness of the arrest under the Fourth Amendment, given that there was
unquestionably probable cause. Id. at 171. But Moore did not change the meaning of
probable cause itself. Moore did not create “free-floating” probable cause, that is, probable
cause that something “bad” is afoot despite the inability to characterize that something bad
as a violation of a specific statute—in Moore, the state code’s prohibition on possessing
cocaine with intent to sell it. The Court has, even post-Moore and post-Pringle, been
understood by lower courts as still requiring probable cause that a specific crime violating a
specific (often state, not federal) statute be shown. See Ligon, 2013 WL 227654, at *2–3.
That the Maryland court cited as support for its reading of Maryland law cases applying at
trial is irrelevant. State statutory law defines the elements of crimes, and those elements
must be shown to be involved to some degree of confidence for probable cause to exist. The
Maryland court held that trial-level case law involving those elements’ meanings was
equally relevant at the probable cause stage. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370–72.
136 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 87, at 188–93 (discussing pre-Pringle precedent).
137 See id. at 193–95 (suggesting this explanation).
138
See id. (suggesting this explanation).
139 See id. (describing some alternative interpretations).
140 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 106–49 (2013) (analyzing empirical data
demonstrating that United States Supreme Court Justices frequently vote in an ideological
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iii. The Representativeness Heuristic Can Be Overcome
Kerr also relied on the representativeness heuristic as a source of
judicial bias.141 But unlike with the anchoring phenomenon, some
heuristics, of which the representativeness heuristic is one example, are “not
some hardwired bias[es] that necessarily cause[] people to think irrationally
about frequency and probability. Instead, [they are] tentative decisionmaking tool[s] that can be relatively easily elicited or suppressed,
depending on how the information is presented and questions are posed.”142
Indeed, expressing probabilities in concrete numbers showing frequencies
rather than in percentages—for example, “60 out of 100”—is a simple
device that helps to avoid triggering the representativeness heuristic.143
Lawyers in an adversary system should be motivated to present
information, such as in a frequency format, to overcome their opponents’
efforts to rely on the representativeness heuristic.144 The 60% figure in
Kerr’s example thus does not necessarily capture the judicial mind via the
representativeness heuristic, especially given the primacy of the 47% figure
for the standard of proof.145
Kerr also offers no empirical proof that such heuristics will so
dominate all judicial reasoning processes that judicial intuitions about
missing evidence will simply shut down. He thinks it self-evident that
courts will wonder about missing evidence, particularly when confronted
solely with generalized probability data, but magically lose such skepticism
if we add in a standard of proof. This position assumes that judges are
automatons beyond the reach of conscious, deliberative, or institutional
forces.146 But doctrine, while having far less impact than formalism
manner where there is room in the law for disagreement).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 105–107. A “heuristic” is a rule of thumb, but
these heuristics evolved, it should be noted, because they are often right; thus, they are not
always a source of bias. See GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE
UNCONSCIOUS 47–49 (2007). See generally KELMAN, supra note 107, at 229–41 (comparing
the “heuristics and biases” school, which focuses on heuristics as leading to logical flaws
with the “fast and frugal heuristics” school, which focuses more on the evolved benefits of
heuristics, finding some truth in each position, depending upon the circumstances).
142 Charles Yablon, The Meaning of Probability Judgments: An Essay on the Use and
Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 899, 925 (discussing the availability
heuristic, but noting that his point also applies to the representativeness heuristic).
143 See GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD 250
(2000).
144 See John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621,
1624 (2010) (“Adversary incentives provide a familiar and powerful, but ultimately
incomplete, justification for entrusting the presentation of evidence to the parties rather than
to the courts.”).
145 See supra text accompanying note 104.
146 Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts’ Fear of the Subconscious in
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suggests, does often have some impact on the courts, especially the trial
courts.147 The Court has repeatedly declared that probable cause is an
individualized, not a generalized, decision focusing on evidence of a
particular individual’s guilt or possession of evidence of crime.148 Lower
court culture may also be imbued with the teachings of this doctrine, though
solid empirical evidence is once again lacking. Individualization demands
that there be evidence beyond some generalized objective statistical
probability linking a defendant to a crime.149 Furthermore, at least upon
appeal, lower courts must articulate and defend their probable cause
decisions in writing.150 The empirical data suggests that the mere
knowledge that they may have to do so in any given case, even if they do
not in advance know which cases will be appealed, will improve their
decisionmaking about the availability of adequate individualizing
evidence.151 If they do not articulate their decisions in writing, the fault
may be in insufficiently clear or muscular precedent.152 But to think that
any one or two heuristics routinely and entirely control judicial judgments
without considering other factors, such as the institutional environment,
makes little sense.153 Moreover, any good judge should want to know how
the police arrived at the 60% and why they think that A’s dorm room is one
of the 60% containing drugs rather than the 40% that are drug free.
Kerr’s explanation of judges’ likely intuitive reactions of suspicion
about missing evidence is also problematic. Kerr argues that the absence of
individualized evidence raises judicial suspicions that police are acting in

Date Rape (and Other) Cases, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 155–57, 169–80 (2007)
(elaborating on these themes and discussing judicial attitudes toward them); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 381,
392–94 (2005) [hereinafter Taslitz, Willfully Blinded] (explaining that there are degrees to
which thoughts are inaccessible to consciousness, that some can be made accessible by
effort, and that others, though never accessible to consciousness, can nevertheless be altered
by conscious action and behavior; and explaining that there is often constant interaction
between conscious and subconscious thought).
147 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 237–53 (concluding that ideology plays a
relatively small role in decisionmaking by federal district court judges and that legalistic
decisionmaking based upon precedent plays a far greater role; though ideology’s influence is
greater where district judges have more discretion, it is still modest; and the likely causes of
this result include a “selection effect” (cases least subject to legalistic thinking pass on to the
appellate courts), effort aversion, and reversal aversion).
148 See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372–73 (2003).
149 See Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 146.
150
See id. at 178.
151 See id. at 154–55, 173–79.
152 See id. at 150, 152–53, 165–68 (critiquing the precedent).
153 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 84–85 (2008) (discussing the effect of the
institutional environment and of precedent on judicial reasoning).
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subjectively bad faith.154 Kerr seems to suggest that this intuition breaks
through to conscious reasoning, and thus is potentially susceptible to
judicial deliberation about the permissibility of relying on a judgment of
bad faith.155 If the courts follow doctrine, of course, an officer’s subjective
bad faith is generally irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment.156 Kerr
might be right about the bad-faith intuition being one reason for judicial
concern. But many other reasons, including the role of missing evidence in
undermining a good story, may play a role as well.157 Indeed, as we will
soon see, Kerr is wrong to view the missing evidence question as one going
solely to the question of probability. It is also relevant to the question of
weight, an arguably entirely different concept.158 Weight partly turns on the
human tendency to reason in terms of sensible stories, as does probability,
if one conceptualizes it differently than does Kerr. Weight refers to a
justifiable expression of confidence that sufficient evidence has been
presented to establish facts meeting a legal standard (facts found by the
crafting of sensible narratives) rather than as a statement of the frequency or
likelihood that such facts exist.159
iv. The Absence of a Standard of Proof Improperly Cedes to Police
Excessive Role-Based Authority
Kerr similarly ignores the distinction between rule-based authority and
role-based authority.160 Rule-based authority draws its legitimacy from
fairly detailed, precise rules, generally crafted by a legislature.161 Rulebased authority is most needed when aggressive action is required to
enforce the law against serious offenders—when the state’s need for the
right to use force is at its peak.162 Rules limit police discretion and prod
154

See Kerr, supra note 88, at 137–39.
See id. at 137–39. Although Kerr asserts that judicial determinations regarding bad
faith proceed “by instinct” and that judges “may not know exactly why something is wrong,”
he also claims that judges can learn to identify these instincts as reason to “resist finding
probable cause” because “something is amiss.” Id. Kerr further argues that such
determinations are sufficiently conscious to produce “estimates” that “accurately assess
probable cause.” Id. at 132.
156 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
157 See infra text accompanying notes 361–368 (discussing missing evidence and
storytelling as central to the concept of evidentiary “weight”).
158 See infra text accompanying notes 348–356.
159 See infra text accompanying notes 354–368.
160 See Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the
Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 621–23 (2006) (explaining the
difference between rule-based and role-based authority).
161 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1994); Miller, supra note 160, at
621–22, 634–35 (providing examples of rule-based jurisprudence).
162 Rules are most needed under these circumstances because there is the greatest danger
155
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police toward specific types of conduct.163 Rules constrain officer behavior
by fostering officer internalization of the rules and by threatening sanctions
against the officer or his case should he not comply with the rules’
mandates.164 But these limits on police abuses also permit the use of the
force and authority that policing of serious crime often requires.165
Role-based authority, by contrast, derives from an official’s status—
her role—a status justified by the official’s special skills and need for
flexibility.166 Role-based authority allows for tailoring responses to the
individual needs of specific cases.167 In the case of police, modern social
norm theorists,168 in a variation of “broken windows theory,”169 argue for
embracing role-based police authority as a way of reducing signs of
disorder in a neighborhood. Reduced disorder encourages community
coherence and other factors that discourage crime.170 Creation of a series of
new low-level offenses, such as curfews, give police the “legal hook” to
exercise this authority, but the statutes are intentionally broadly crafted to
give police enormous flexibility.171 That flexibility is needed if police are
to help keep neighborhoods clean and orderly without routine resort to
force.172
Role-based authority implies police partnership with the
community to serve community needs for order and respect.173
The problem with social norm theories, argues policing scholar Eric
Miller, is that they enable the same actors—the police—to exercise both
of police abuse yet the most need for effective police action. See Miller, supra note 160, at
644–45.
163 See id.
164
See id. at 635–37. Correspondingly, rule-based authority fails when the rules are
poorly enforced or “riddled with exceptions,” or when police resist internalization. See id. at
654–55.
165 They do so by fostering the legitimacy of the police and the legal system under which
they operate. See id. at 635–37.
166 See id. at 622–23, 635, 638–40.
167 See id. at 632–34, 638–40.
168 See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391,
413–14 (2000); Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 698–700
(1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 820–21 (1998); Miller, supra note 160, at 633–34.
169 See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1998).
170 See Miller, supra note 160, at 618–20.
171 See id. at 651–52; William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J.
2137, 2153–54 & n.53 (2002) (“Since crimes can include such things as traffic offenses, . . .
this power gives the police the ability to search, without a warrant, almost anyone in a
vehicle, plus (depending on the stringency of local curfews and quality-of-life ordinances) a
large portion of the pedestrian population to boot.”).
172 See Miller, supra note 160, at 622–23.
173 See id. at 632–33, 666–71.
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rule-based and role-based authority.174 That aggregation of power has
numerous ill effects. Notably, rule-based and role-based norms can conflict
in a given situation, forcing police to choose.175 Too often, police are illfitted to apply role-based authority effectively.176 They are trained
primarily in a militaristic style and are more comfortable with sanctioning
others for apparent violations of rules than with the community-solidifying
function that role-based authority is meant to serve.177 When seeming
conflicts arise between the need for ostensibly rule-based and role-based
action, police are likely to opt for the seemingly rule-based, sanctioning-ofothers option.178 But because police also have role-based authority, they
may act in a discretionary fashion while serving the rule-based role of
enforcer.179 Police may therefore serve neither function effectively.180
Indeed, police investing energy into attempts to solidify community
norms may divert resources from stricter rule-based law enforcement.181
Yet police poorly exercising role-based discretionary authority can
undermine community trust, promoting the very community dissolution that
role-based authority is designed to counter.182 The resentment that many
poor, minority communities feel toward the police, argues Miller, is partly
due to this problem.183 Police may also use their discretionary authority as
an excuse for developing justifications to go after the higher level offenses
embraced by rule-based action.184 The new lower level offenses thus
become just another tool for police serving their more traditional role.185
The result can be both underpolicing—in the sense of too little effective
174

See id. at 636–37, 657–58.
See id. at 658–63 (discussing “role confusion” as a policing tactic).
176 See id. at 646–51, 658–63.
177 See MARLEEN EASTON ET AL., BLURRING MILITARY AND POLICE ROLES (2010); Peter
B. Kraska, The Military–Criminal Justice Blur: An Introduction, in MILITARIZING THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND
THE POLICE 3, 5–8 (2001).
178 See Miller, supra note 160, at 658–63.
179 See id. at 646–51, 657–63.
180 See id.
181 Cf. id. at 627–28 (discussing “under-policing”); id. at 665 (discussing the need for
attention to law enforcement resources allocated to traditional reactive rather than novel
preventative policing); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715,
1716–19 (2006).
182 See Miller, supra note 160, at 636–37, 650–52.
183 See id.; Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 15 (2003).
184 See Miller, supra note 160, at 645–51, 657–58, 660–63.
185 See id.; Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 363–65 (2001) (discussing the dangers of police’s
“command and control” model dominating).
175
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police presence as community partners—and overpolicing—in the sense of
too much police use of rule-based force in situations requiring a subtler
approach.186
This dangerous mixture of rule- and-role-based authority in the single
institution of the police has, Miller deftly recounts, reached the United
States Supreme Court in its articulation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
doctrine.187 For example, the Court has increasingly defined reasonable
suspicion, and even probable cause, as requiring case-by-case judgments
made largely by deference to officers’ discretionary authority.188 Yet
officers use that authority to exercise force—to stop, arrest, and search—
precisely the kind of situation that most requires rule-based constraints on
officers’ conduct.189 Deference to police autonomy also corrodes the
requirements that officers be able to explain and justify their force-based
privacy invasions in detail to promote accountability.190 The requirement
that police act only based upon “articulable suspicion”191 thus degenerates
into whatever suspicion the officer’s “experience” tells him is justified.
Similarly, the Court’s refusal to review officer search-and-seizure decisions
to determine whether they were motivated by racial bias or stereotyping
shields officers from effective review.192 The Court has even gone so far as
to ignore usual or standard police practices in favor of the practices that an
officer in fact chooses based upon his own individualized experience and

186

See Miller, supra note 160, at 625–28; Natapoff, supra note 181.
See Miller, supra note 160, at 638–42, 645–51.
188 See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 666–69 (1994); David A. Harris, Particularized
Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality
Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 988 (1998); Miller, supra note 160, at
638–42, 645–51; Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2492–93 (1996).
189 See Miller, supra note 160, at 645–51 (summarizing illustrative cases).
190 See id. at 646–47 (“Now, almost any evidence that a police officer can proffer will
suffice to provide reasonable suspicion. In the reasonable suspicion totality-of-thecircumstances calculus, the officer’s training is not just one fact among many, but one that
operates as a lens through which to view the other facts. The officer’s ability to explain how
otherwise-innocent conduct is, under the circumstances and properly understood, suspicious,
characterizes the police as well-trained, experienced experts responding to ‘imponderable
evidence’ of criminality.”); Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 166–68, 196–
97 (analyzing how judicial deference to officer judgments makes the latter’s explanations
meaningless and eliminates effective accountability).
191 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 21
(“[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”).
192 See Miller, supra note 160, at 650–51 (discussing racial bias); Taslitz, Individualized
Suspicion, supra note 29, at 162–64 (discussing stereotyping).
187

874

ANDREW E. TASLITZ

[Vol. 103

judgment.193 These examples illustrate the poor fit between the role-based
authority the Court broadly grants to police rather than limiting it to the
kinds of situations where discretionary, case-by-case judgment is most
wise.194
The vaguer the standards articulated to guide action, the greater the
sphere of role-based authority.195 The Court’s abandonment of the “twopronged” Aguilar–Spinelli test, which prohibited courts from even
considering weak informants’ tips in the probable cause calculus, in favor
of the murkier Gates “totality of the circumstances” test that weighs all
evidence is one illustration of a move toward role-based authority.196 The
Court’s insistence on barring any standard of proof for probable cause
decisions likewise enhances officers’ discretionary, role-based authority.197
Kerr thus ignores the fact that standards of proof do not only guide the
courts. Just as prosecutors’ decisions on whom to charge with what are
affected by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, so should police
decisions of whom to arrest and search and where would likely be so
influenced.198 The absence of a standard of proof or the existence of an
implied one that is seen as infinitely flexible may tempt ideologically
energetic law-and-order courts to defer to police judgments, as many
commentators argue the current Court is doing.199 Likewise, such courts
may vary the degree of justification required for police action so as to favor
193 See Miller, supra note 160, at 646–47; Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note
29, at 166–67.
194 See Miller, supra note 160, at 636. Miller thus recommends that other institutions,
not the police, have the primary responsibility for role-based crime-preventative action. See
id. at 663–65.
195 See id. at 645–51.
196 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 87, at 201, 211–13 (analyzing the consequences of the
Court’s abandonment of the old Aguilar–Spinelli rule). The Aguilar–Spinelli rule, it should
be noted, required courts to consider multiple factors but in a more orderly, guided fashion
than is true of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Such multifactor guided tests have the
added virtue of helping to reduce the grip of cognitive biases on judicial reasoning. See
supra note 130 (discussing how scripts, checklists, and multifactor tests serving as reminders
of other considerations can help to reduce judicial cognitive biases).
197 See supra text accompanying notes 86–88 (discussing this insistence).
198 See Kaplow, supra note 85, at 751, 815 (arguing that standards of proof create
incentives for individual and institutional actors to change their behavior accordingly; for
example, high standards may effectively authorize certain conduct that cannot be proven to
the level required by the relevant standard).
199 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 106–49 (arguing that the Court’s Justices often
vote in an ideological fashion); Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the
Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search And Seizure”
Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 934 (2010) (“[O]ver roughly the last four
decades the continuing conservative majority of the justices of the Supreme Court have
reduced Fourth Amendment doctrine to little more than a rhetorical apparition.”).
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law enforcement interests routinely, if not completely, over individual ones
in the interests of promoting law and order.200 The effect is to vest police
with great discretion, offering room for police to embrace the role-based
model of policing.201 That limits the value of probable cause (and
reasonable suspicion) in constraining the state’s use of force.202 Kerr’s
failure to address the rule- versus role-based distinction is also but one
example of his ignoring the social value of standards of proof outlined
earlier in this section.203 Kerr thus looks solely to the purported costs of
standards of proof without acknowledging or weighing them against the
benefits.
Kerr’s most egregious error, however, is a different one: his
assumption that the probable cause inquiry inherently involves an
assessment of objective probabilities. It does not. Rather, the assessment is
one of subjective probabilities, assessed in light of rational bases for
inference, an entirely different concept.
4. Subjective Probability and Probable Cause
i.

General Principles

There are many different conceptions of probability, but two are most
relevant here: objective or frequentist versus subjective probabilities.204
Objective probabilities look to empirical data to determine the frequency
with which similar events occur.205 For example, if four out of every ten
200

Cf. Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and
the Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 444 (2011) (arguing that our system
effectively allows prosecutors to lower the standard of proof for repeat offenders).
201 See Miller, supra note 160, at 645–51 (making similar point but not connecting it to
the absence of a standard of proof as one potential contributor). Judicial abdication of
significant limits on officer discretion via undue deference to officer judgments and, at best,
vaguely stated bases for those supposedly intuitive judgments may also create a move
toward role-based policing authority by reducing the required “weight” of evidence and
degree of serious police accountability. See infra text accompanying notes 379–387.
202 It is important to note that rule-based and role-based policing are less a dichotomy
than points on a spectrum. See Miller, supra note 160, at 621–23 (implying this point).
Similarly, a standard of proof need not be imbued with an unachievable absolute clarity
capable of mechanical application to be of value in guiding and limiting both judicial and
officer discretion. Cf. LAUDAN, supra note 68, at 74–87 (arguing for a less-than-mechanical
verbal formulation of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof that he sees as far
superior to the current versions of the standard which, in his view, are not standards of proof
at all). There is therefore no inconsistency between my defense of subjective probabilities
over objective ones in the next subsection and the need for a standard of proof that limits
officer discretion.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 67–88.
204 See TERENCE ANDERSON ET AL., ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 228–29 (2d ed. 2005).
205 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 907–08.
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randomly selected individuals had pollen allergies in a given location, there
would be a 40% likelihood that any randomly selected person will have
pollen allergies.
But objectivist approaches to probability can be applied only to groups
or to randomly selected individuals when we know nothing more about
each individual than that he fits in a particular category, in the above
example, living in a particular location.206 Objectivist probability cannot
tell us the likelihood that a future unique event will occur or that a past
unique event has occurred.207 For example, being told that there is a 10%
chance that smoking will cause lung cancer does not tell you the probability
that a particular smoker, John, has lung cancer.208 John may be young, hale,
from a genetically blessed family of cancer-free smokers, or he may have
other individual attributes that make him more or less likely to develop
cancer relative to a randomly selected smoker.209 That does not mean that
the objective data is irrelevant, but it does mean that we cannot rely on the
10% figure as accurately reflecting John’s unique risk. Nor would John’s
developing or not developing lung cancer objectively confirm or refute any
judgment of his risk.210 That is so because John is a unique person. We
cannot clone physically, emotionally, intellectually identical Johns, with
identical life experiences, in large numbers, have them smoke, and see how
many of them would develop lung cancer—the only way of determining
empirically verifiable objective probability.
But we can make a subjective judgment. Subjective probability
judgments “represent the degree of rational belief that the speaker holds
about the likelihood of occurrence of the event in question.”211 Subjective
206

See id. at 909.
See id. at 901–03.
208 See id. at 902.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 901–02.
211 See id. at 910; see also L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF INDUCTION AND PROBABILITY 59 (1989). This quote from Yablon speaks about the
degree of “rational belief.” Logicians and mathematicians, however, would define
subjective probability as simply the degree of a person’s belief, rational or not, albeit subject
to rules of consistency. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Yablon’s point and mine,
however, is that legal processes can and do subject individual beliefs to scrutiny in the light
of reason. It is that scrutiny—pursuant to standards of critique common among laypersons
and other standards common in the legal profession—that results in acceptance of some
beliefs as rational. Subjective beliefs themselves, of course, arise from ordinary reasoning
processes, thus requiring some understanding of human psychology. But whatever beliefs
result, they must be justified to others in the courts or among legal combatants outside of the
courts. Ultimately, therefore, subjective beliefs processed though legal critique lead to
rational inferences arrived at through prevailing norms of sound reasoning. Whether we use
the logicians’ and mathematicians’ terminology of “subjective probability” referring only to
207
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probability judgments are thus psychological, rather than strictly
mathematical, judgments.212 But that does not mean that they are useless.
To the contrary, “[t]hey are subject to change through evidence and
argument, and they have objective consequences in the actions you take,
such as whether you go out at night in bad neighborhoods or take
antidepressants.”213 Moreover, there is an undeniably social component to
the formation of subjective probability judgments. The process by which
lawyers settle cases is an example:
If I believe that a case has a ten-percent likelihood of success, and you believe it has a
seventy-five percent chance, then the subjectivist concept gives us no way of
resolving the dispute, or even why it is a dispute and not merely a disparity of beliefs.
Yet, surely two lawyers who reached such disparate conclusions about the likelihood
of success on a case would (1) view the simultaneous assertion by two trained lawyers
that the same case had a ten-percent and a seventy-five percent chance of success as
somehow involving inconsistent judgments and (2) seek to resolve the inconsistencies
through discussion of objective features of the case. In short, they would act as if the
probability were to be determined by an analysis of objective features of the case and
that consensus as to a “correct” probability was obtainable through such analysis.214

A lawyer would be guilty of malpractice if he settled such a lawsuit
based solely on knowing that, for example, cases of that general category
(say, medical malpractice) settled on average for 10% of the requested
dollar amount.215 The lawyer would be expected to investigate the law and
the facts,216 “to evaluate the likelihood of success based on all the individual
factors relating to that specific case: the nature of the evidence presented at
trial, the strength of the legal issues on appeal, the reputation of the trial
beliefs or Yablon’s terminology describing subjective probability as rational beliefs, the
results for the legal system are the same.
212 See RICHARD JEFFREY, SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY: THE REAL THING 79 (2004).
213 I thus perhaps disagree with philosopher Larry Laudan when he seemingly argues that
a standard of proof relying on subjective judgments, including presumably subjective
probability judgments, is no standard of proof at all because it does not give the
decisionmaker an objective guidepost against which to measure whether his subjective belief
is justified. See LAUDAN, supra note 68, at 79–81. Determining whether subjective beliefs
held with the necessary degree of certainty are justified based on the evidence and rational
inferences from it is a necessary part of what properly designed legal proceedings encourage
decisionmakers to do. It is why juries deliberate and judges in many instances must verbally
defend their conclusions in great detail, often in the form of written opinions. The
decisionmaker must then ask herself, “Is my subjective sense of having the required degree
of confidence in my judgment justified based upon the evidence and rational inferences from
it?” Only if that answer is “yes” is the standard met. Accountability mechanisms further
reduce the likelihood of error and increase the likelihood of error correction. Perhaps we can
better articulate the meaning of a particular standard of proof for a decisionmaker, but
subjective probabilities, as here defined, do not render the standard meaningless.
214 Yablon, supra note 142, at 911.
215 See id. at 904.
216 See id.
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judge, and the appellate court’s prior rulings on similar issues.”217
Objectivist probability should primarily control if there are uniform
processes sufficiently accounting for relevant factors in the statistics such
that we can fairly view an individual case as a largely fungible instance of
the same broader phenomenon.218 Where objective risks and base rates219
are unavailable, subjectivist probability alone controls.220 Subjective
probabilities also govern events with unusual or unique components.221 But
there is also a vast middle ground where uncertainty rules the applicability
of generalized statistics to the individual case.222 In such instances,
objective data may be consulted but only as part of the subjectivist
probability determination.223 The quality of any objective data—its
trustworthiness—also matters, while subjective judgments can be critiqued
based on standards of rational inference and adequacy of evidence.224 If
217

Id. at 909.
See id. at 903, 941.
219 “Base rates” are also sometimes called “prior probabilities.” See ANDERSON ET AL.,
supra note 204, at 251, 399 (explaining prior probabilities). In objectivist terms, a base rate
is the prior probability of an event’s occurring in the relevant population before using a
technique with a known error rate. Concerning probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the
base rate is the rate of occurrence of the relevant crime before using an investigative
technique, such as a drug-sniffing dog. See Goldberg, supra note 120, at 32–33. For
example, suppose that a dog has a false positive rate (the rate of reacting to cocaine when it
is not present) of only .2%. That does not mean that there is a 99.8% likelihood when he
reacts to the supposed presence of cocaine that he is correct. If cocaine is present in stopped
vehicles only one in every 10,000 times, then the dog’s false positive rate means that he will
falsely alert to cocaine twenty times in every 10,000 searches (10,000 x .002). But if he has
a zero false negative rate (he never fails to alert when he should), he will accurately alert
once (since cocaine is present in the one in 10,000 cars). But that means that, of the twentyone total times that he alerts, he is right only once—an accuracy-in-alerting rate of 5%. See
id. at 33 (offering this example). Being correct 5% of the time should not establish probable
cause or reasonable suspicion under any theory. The example thus illustrates why having no
general false positive rates is meaningless without also knowing base rates.
220 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 910. For a discussion of the importance of keeping in
mind base rates, see BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 225–35.
221 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 910.
222 See id. at 907–08.
223 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 34–38 (2003) (illustrating how this can be done in
the context of psychological clinical judgment, particularly in certain forensic settings);
Yablon, supra note 142, at 911–12. Rephrased, the objective assessment can be used as an
anchor, with the subjective assessment adjusting from the anchor upward or downward. This
is standard in risk assessment of the likelihood of criminal reoffending, for example, a
person may have a high-risk score but is now a paraplegic, has found God, or has
successfully completed a drug-treatment program. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R.
FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 71 (2011); Christopher
Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Juvenile Justice, 27 CRIM. J. 10 (2012).
224 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 941.
218
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relevant trustworthy objective data is available and wildly out of line with a
subjective judgment, for example, that may provide grounds for rejecting
the subjective assessment.225
Where subjective probability assessments are appropriate, the potential
for heuristics to affect judgment does not mean we should seek some other
assessment method. Heuristics evolved because they are often right226 and,
absent objective reasons to doubt their accuracy in a particular case, they
cannot automatically be assumed to lead a decisionmaker into error.227
Kahneman and Tversky—the primary figures in the rise of thinking about
heuristics228—saw the value of awareness of heuristics as a reminder not to
make snap decisions or to let rules of thumb shortcut data collection and
conscious, more deliberative reasoning when making subjective probability
assessments.229 Subjective probability judgments, even if subject to the risk
of distortion by heuristics, are often the best option available.230
Subjective assessments also embody underlying values.231 Lay people
225

See id. at 908–09.
See GIGERENZER, supra note 141, at 60–63 (explaining that heuristics evolved because
of their frequent cognitive benefits).
227 BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 368 (“Like other heuristics, the affect heuristic
can conduce to good decision making, but it also has the potential to distort the process.
Whether intuition and affect play a constructive role in decision making depends on the
nature and context of the decision at hand.”).
228 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 920–21.
229 See id. at 928–29.
230 Professor Yablon made the point this way:
226

When we believe that the causal processes involved in the event we are predicting are uniform or
stochastic and repetitive in nature, like those involving purely physical processes such as tire
failures or roulette wheels, we are more likely to rely purely or primarily on statistical data.
Conversely, when we believe the event being predicted will be the result of a relatively unique
and unusual confluence of many nonrecurring factors or involving individual decision makers,
such as the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination, we are more likely to put our faith in the
subjective assessments of the knowledgeable observers.

Id. at 903; see also id. at 905 (noting that subjective probability judgments under the right
conditions “may be the best available response to uncertainty”); id. at 922 (“As Kahneman
and Tversky were well aware, the effect and usefulness of availability are more difficult to
assess when dealing with probabilities of individual events.”); id. at 926–28 (arguing that
Kahneman and Tversky’s writings are best understood as cautioning decisionmakers to
consider the proper role of heuristics in making subjective probability judgments); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 106, at 163, 175–76 (explaining
that, where objectively correct answers cannot be known, as in “many real-life situations
where probabilities are judged,” “[n]evertheless, the availability heuristic may be applied to
evaluate the likelihood of such events,” then giving as an example a psychologist involved in
making a clearly subjective probability judgment about the diagnosis and proper treatment of
a particular patient).
231 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 937–39.
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thus do not seem to conceptualize risk as merely a question of objective
likelihood.232 They care partly about the number of people who might be
injured.233 But their risk assessments reflect judgments about the value of
the loss being risked versus the value of the social benefit to be gained.234
Activities seen to have substantial benefits become viewed as less risky,
and those with small benefits more risky.235 People also care about how
risks come about and their emotional reactions to the risks.236 They
therefore view activities as “riskier . . . [if they] were involuntary, delayed,
uncontrollable, dreaded, or severe (certainly fatal).”237 Likewise, people
view activities they dislike as riskier than those they like even though the
objective probabilities of each occurring are the same. 238 Accordingly,
“[b]ecause most people disapprove of nuclear weapons, warfare, DDT,
handguns, crime, and nuclear power, they see them as greater risks than
swimming pools, home appliances, and downhill skiing, even if the latter
cause more deaths to Americans in the average year.”239 Because these
judgments fuse values and facts, they are not objectively “wrong” but rather
“represent the individualized value judgments of citizens in a democratic
society.”240 This explanation also has consequences for how willing people
should be to defer to experts. Some judgments, such as the likelihood of a
nuclear power plant exploding, have such low base rates that useful
frequentist data is not available, making a nuclear specialist’s testimony of
the dangers inherent in a particular plant certainly relevant but not
controlling.241 Moreover, if the “risk” of error is being assessed, which
necessarily involves value judgments, there is no a priori reason to assume
that the expert’s judgments accurately reflect those of the decisionmaker.242
Concerning the topic of this Article, there is indeed good reason not to defer
to expert judgment—here, the judgment of the police—both because the
232

See id.
See id.
234 See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the RiskAssessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 390, 390 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000);
Yablon, supra note 142, at 937–39.
235 See Slovic, supra note 234, at 118–19.
236 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 937–39; cf. Paul Slovic et al., Rational Actors or
Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral Economics, 31 J. SOCIOECON. 329, 332, 339 (2002) (arguing that images, marked by positive and negative affective
feelings, guide judgment and decisionmaking; that is, people use an affect heuristic to make
judgments).
237 Yablon, supra note 142, at 938.
238
See Slovic, supra note 234, at 415.
239 Yablon, supra note 142, at 938.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 937–38.
242 See id. at 941–42.
233
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probable cause determination and its associated subjective probability
assessment involve some value judgments better made by courts than police
and because police themselves operate in an environment increasing the
likelihood that their probable cause (and reasonable suspicion) judgments
will be subject to error.243
ii. Application to Standards of Proof
The process of factfinding in a court case involves just these sorts of
subjectivist probability judgments. Standards like beyond a reasonable
doubt, preponderance of the evidence, and probable cause are best
understood as inviting decisionmakers to decide how probable events are or
were in this subjective sense.244 If probability falls short of the applicable

243

Professor Sunstein bristles at the idea that there is no such thing as an objectively
verifiable “risk.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1147
(2002). Professor Yablon sees the debate as partly being about when to defer to experts and
what weight to accord their probability judgments. See Yablon, supra note 142, at 941.
Says Yablon, “when the risk involved appears subject to accurate assessment through
frequentist methodologies, deferral to expertise is more appropriate than when the experts
merely offer a subjective risk assessment, which may differ from that of lay people.” Id.
For unique, nonrepeatable events not fully amenable to scientific treatment, deference to
experts is less advisable, in part because of the role of value judgments. See id. Thus, says
Yablon, Sunstein is right that heuristics may sometimes lead lay risk assessors into error as
contradicted by sound scientific data, but cognitive psychologist Slovic is right that
“subjectivity, uncertainty, and cognitive biases may play a dominant role in expert opinions
that are not entitled to be privileged over those of lay persons.” Id. Although Yablon,
Slovic, and Sunstein are talking primarily about the risk of physical harms from accidents
and similar events, Yablon’s logic governs the probable cause decision too. As a subjective
probability judgment, whether the standard of proof for probable cause is met—and even
what probable cause is—will unavoidably be influenced by value judgments concerning the
relative worth of privacy, property, and freedom of movement versus the risks posed by
potential crimes. Those value judgments are better made by judges, who at least strive to
reflect the values embodied in the law, than by police officers involved in the “competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969)
(citation omitted). Furthermore, police are subject to many heuristics that under the
circumstances facing police are likely to lead them into error. See Taslitz, Cognitive
Obstacles, supra note 29, at 40–47. There is, therefore, no reason for courts to defer to
officer judgments in probable cause determinations.
244 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 246. But see Engel, supra note 83, at 436
(arguing that the preponderance of evidence standard in the United States reflects objective
probability concepts but that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard embraces a more
subjective philosophy). I find little support, however, in Engel’s piece for his assertion that a
more objectivist quality is embraced by the preponderance standard. I find the argument
unconvincing, in any event, for reasons noted earlier and to come, and I do not see it as the
only or best way to understand that standard, and finally, I believe that the objectivist
concept fails in practice because it is not psychologically realistic. Engel is likewise a critic
of objectivist approaches to the standard of proof, so I quibble only with his assertion that
the law embraces them in the preponderance burden.
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standard, whatever action is being sought will not be approved.245 In the
probable cause context, as noted earlier, the law indeed assumes that each
event is unique and that an individualized judgment is required.246
Objective, numerical data will rarely be available.247 When it is available,
however, it can usually still only play a role (the rare exceptions are
discussed shortly) as a factor in the judge’s decision about the probability of
the unique event before her.248 The judge will be concerned about the
“risk” of error, but that risk assessment will necessarily reflect value
judgments about the conduct of the police, the wisdom of their chosen
methods of investigation, the social benefits to be obtained by their
activities, and the social costs their actions create.249 The judge will make
her decision knowing that she may have to justify her actions and that they
can be subject to critique and reversal by an appellate court.250 Her actions
can be criticized as involving poor judgments of various sorts based on the
evidence before her.251 But she must implicitly decide whether she is
“convinced enough” or “confident enough” to approve of the officer’s
actions.252
Many judges apparently need and thus do craft some sort of implicit
benchmark or standard of proof.253 To make that standard explicit and
uniform does not mean that two judges will always agree on the existence
245

See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 230.
See Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 146; supra text accompanying
notes 133–135. Part of the appeal of the subjectivist approach to me is precisely that it
embraces the idea that a unique, individualized assessment is involved (albeit informed by
some generalizations) and that that stance serves important social goals. See ANDERSON ET
AL., supra note 204, at 266–69 (discussing transcase versus case-specific generalizations and
their role in individualized proof); Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 173–
85.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 230–242.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 217–222 (discussing the role of objective
probability data, where available, in making subjective probability assessments).
249 See supra notes 230–249 and accompanying text.
250 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 241 (“Courts of appeals apparently exert
sufficient control over district judges, even when the appellate judges are adhering
scrupulously to a deferential standard of review, to dissuade the district judges from allowing
ideology to determine their decisions.”); Taslitz, Cognitive Obstacles, supra note 29, at 65–
67 (discussing the positive effects of accountability, albeit illustrating these effects in the
context of policing).
251 See supra notes 71–75.
252 Cf. Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Constitutionality of Summary
Judgment (Dec. 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at ssrn.com/abstract=
2190257 (distinguishing in the civil context between objective probability and “confidence”
in a way consistent with much of my argument here).
253 See McCauliff, supra note 104, at 1324–33 (discussing judicial survey on burdens of
proof); Slobogin, supra note 27, at 20–21.
246
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or absence of probable cause in a specific case. But it does mean that the
law would send a message to judges about how confident they must be in
the rightness of their decisions based on all the practical considerations that
enter into subjective probability assessments. It is generally not possible to
critique such subjective judgments on the ground that they have led to error
because of heuristic “biases,” but, as noted earlier, procedures can be used
to reduce the risks of such mistakes.254 Nor can subjective probability
assessments involved in judging whether a standard of proof has been met
generally be declared “wrong” simply because they are based in part on
objective data, where available, or because of the precise relationship
between that data and the individualized, unique decision being made. 255
Standards of proof in the area of probable cause can therefore not be
rejected on the theory that they will distort objective probability judgments
because such judgments are in fact not being made. Rather, it is subjective
probability assessments that are at work, and they operate pursuant to their
own logic and standards of critique.
5. But What Should the Standard of Proof Be for Probable Cause?
Having argued that a standard of proof is necessary for the probable
cause determination still leaves open the question: what should that
standard of proof be? This question is ultimately a normative one, subject
to great debate. I will argue here, however, for a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
Notably, several commentators have argued that the preponderance of
the evidence standard is in practice the one that most judges use.256 One of
the few empirical studies done (albeit some time ago) found great
variability but did find that many judges used that standard.257 The average
of all the judges in that study was just short of a preponderance (thus the
47% figure used by Kerr).258 It is important to remember that much
evidence inadmissible at trial will be admissible in the probable cause
determination and that the initial determination—even if amended to focus
more heavily on missing evidence—is still made ex parte.259 The process is
not an adversarial one. The preponderance standard can therefore be much
easier to meet in the warrant context than at a civil trial.
254

See supra text accompanying notes 141–153.
See supra text accompanying notes 218–225.
256 See Slobogin, supra note 27, at 20 (explaining that Slobogin’s definition “adopts the
preponderance standard, which is likely the way most judges think about probable cause”).
257 See McCauliff, supra note 104, at 1303, 1307, 1327.
258 See id. The judges’ estimates varied widely, however, with the approximately 47%
figure being the arithmetic mean or average of all the individual estimates. See id.
259 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 87, at 238–40.
255
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That most human reasoning implicitly or explicitly involves metaphor
also counsels in favor of the preponderance standard.260 Metaphors
structure human thought, bringing disparate information together into an
understandable whole.261 Because of this, language using metaphor is
easier to remember, comprehend, and organize.262 Metaphors are a “visual
aid to memory,” creating vivid mental images.263 Metaphors make you
think, using many mental circuits at once.264 Some metaphors are implicit,
others explicit, others both.265 While some metaphors overused in language
can lose their punch, others retain their power because they are so
fundamental to how we see the world.266 The metaphor of the scales of
justice, I argue, is one retaining its power.267 It is easy to visualize a scale
tipping. It can be used to good effect in jury instructions and in oral
argument.268 Evidence must be of sufficient weight to tip the scales in one
direction rather than another. Because standards of proof are imbued with
values and are comprehended in terms of stories, they are best not defined
in precise mathematical terms.269 But decisionmakers must be given some
guidance about their meaning. The image of the scale tipping does just
that.270 On the other hand, what equally effective metaphor is available for
“47%,” “33 1/3%,” or some other lesser and mathematical definition of the
standard of proof? Perhaps some are conceivable (“almost but not quite

260 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 404, 424–29 (1996).
261 See id. at 425–26.
262
See JOSEPH J. ROMM, LANGUAGE INTELLIGENCE: LESSONS ON PERSUASION FROM
JESUS, SHAKESPEARE, LINCOLN, AND LADY GAGA 101 (2012).
263 See id. at 102.
264 See id. at 103.
265 See
generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE
LIVE BY (2003).
266 See LAKOFF, supra note 265, at 65–140 (giving examples of well-worn metaphors that
still structure our thoughts, the primary ones discussed being rooted in images of parenting);
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 265, at 14–19 (similar); ROMM, supra note 262, at 110
(“Some similes and metaphors strike such a strong chord that they become a permanent part
of our culture.”); id. at 117 (arguing that some overused metaphors become “dying
metaphors,” losing their vividness and emotional power).
267 See PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.42 (3d ed.
2005) (using the ordinary balance scale as the explanatory metaphor in jury instructions
defining the preponderance standard of proof).
268
See id.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 76–82, 156–158.
270 Cf. LAKOFF, supra note 265, at 44–64 (discussing the continuing power of metaphors
involving balance, albeit describing the primary one as “moral accounting”—a balancing of
books).
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hitting the ‘finish line’”?),271 but I at least find it hard to craft ones with the
same clarity and force as the scales. Certainly images of balancing scales
are pervasive and powerful in the law, dominating much of constitutional
reasoning;272 basic concepts of debt underlying restitution and retribution;273
the legal conceptualization of reasonable behavior;274 and the public and
professional imagery of the law serving grand ideals.275
Empiricists have also studied defining “fuzzy” verbal standards of
proof, primarily preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt.276 The fuzziness of these standards is best understood in connection
with storytelling theory. Much reasoning about evidence involves the
construction of stories.277 Much story construction occurs rapidly and
subconsciously.278 If an intuitive result is reached subconsciously,
information supporting the result may be inflated, and conflicting evidence

271 I discuss other alternatives infra in the text accompanying notes 306–308, but to say
that there are logically conceivable alternative metaphors is not the same as saying those
metaphors have the same power, either in our legal or broader political culture.
272 See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS 343 (Doron Kalir trans., 2012) (“‘[B]alancing’ is an analytical process that
places the proper purpose of the limiting law on one side of the scales and the limited
constitutional right on the other, while balancing the benefit gained by the proper purpose
with the harm it causes to the right.”).
273 See MARGARET ATWOOD, PAYBACK: DEBT AND THE SHADOW SIDE OF WEALTH 9–19
(2008) (discussing the importance of debt as central to all these areas and explaining how the
concept is rooted in an idea of balance, albeit of equal balance, in our culture); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Reciprocity and the Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 41 STETSON L. REV. 73
(2011) (extending these and related concepts to legal categories, particularly in the criminal
law).
274 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194–96 (1991)
(explaining that tort negligence occurs when the likely social harm of conduct outweighs its
benefits, though arguing against a similar test in criminal law); see also, e.g., Leslie Yalof
Garfield, A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A Prescription for the
Legislature, 65 TENN. L. REV. 875 (1998) (arguing for criminalizing ordinary tort negligence
under certain circumstances).
275 Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1765 (1987)
(“The blindfold is not the only indication in justice imagery of the complex relationship
between judge and sovereign. The scales have relevance here as well; the scales may
suggest that an objective standard, independent of the whim of any ruler (as well as of the
judge), governs the outcome. The king’s thumb is poised to tip the scales, but Justice’s firm
grip provides some security. Similarly, the sword might be understood as giving Justice an
independent base of power; a strength beyond that given to her by her sovereignemployer.”).
276 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 260–61, 265.
277 See id. at 148, 156–57.
278 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision
Making, 49 COGNITION 123, 136 (1993).
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deflated.279 But this does not mean that defining standards of proof serves
no function. Instructing decisionmakers on the standard of proof leads
them to see it as instructing them on the appropriate degree of
confidence.280 With jurors, it may seem that they have little motivation to
follow the spirit of these instructions because they face no sanctions. What
the empirical evidence shows, however, is that instructions are a “somatic
marker,” bringing emotions into play.281 Such a marker is especially
effective if the institutional setting is designed to promote accountability,
for example, via instructions expressly designed to impress on jurors their
accountability to society for their decisions—their degree of personal
responsibility—and via the solemn formal procedures and environment of
the jury trial.282 Somatic markers “reduce options and focus attention.”283
“They induce the individual to take a risk very seriously.”284 In terms of
storytelling, standard-of-proof instructions raise the required plausibility of
a story, its completeness of information, coherence, and uniqueness.285 The
emotional appeal of the standard raises the level of proof required before
activating what might otherwise be jurors’ subconsciously preferred choice

279

See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal
Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 522–23 (2004).
280 See Engel, supra note 83, at 458 (“The psychological correlate of the standard of
proof is confidence.”). Some experiments arguably suggested that higher burdens of proof
merely led subjects to discount even more the influence of evidence contrary to their
intuitively derived result. See Simon, supra note 279, at 524–25, 528–29, 531–32. But,
“[h]appily, this interpretation seems to be wrong.” SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 156 (1988)
(discussing differing effects of the differing standards); Engel, supra note 83, at 460; Norbert
L. Kerr et al., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned
Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 282,
293 (1976) (offering empirical evidence that standards of proof do affect reasoning);
Andreas Glöckner & Christoph Engel, Can We Trust the Intuitive Juror? An Experimental
Analysis 18, 22–23 (Max Planck Inst. for Res. on Collective Goods, Preprint No. 2008/36,
2008), available at http:/www.coll.mpg.ed/pdf_dat/2008_36online.pdf. I am using the word
“confidence” in its commonsense meaning, largely synonymous with degree of certitude of a
belief, and not in the technical sense that the term “confidence” has in certain probability
judgments. See, e.g., NEIL J. SALKIND, STATISTICS FOR PEOPLE WHO (THINK THEY) HATE
STATISTICS 134–50 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining statistical “significance” as a frequentist,
objectivist measure of the degree of “confidence” in stating that a particular finding is true).
281 See ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN 173 (1994); Antoine Bechara & Antonio Damasio, The Somatic Marker Hypothesis:
A Neural Theory of Economic Decisions, 52 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 336, 339 (2005)
(linking somatic markers to decisionmaking processes); Engel, supra note 83, at 464.
282 See Engel, supra note 83, at 463–65.
283 Engel, supra note 83, at 464; see also DAMASIO, supra note 281, at 173.
284 Engel, supra note 83, at 464; see also DAMASIO, supra note 281, at 173.
285 Engel, supra note 83, at 461.
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relative to other options.286
The same is as true or more so for judges. Relatively few lawyers are
chosen to be a judge, a position of honor.287 “Judges are appointed in a
ceremonial way.
Throughout judicial procedure, all are reminded
repeatedly that the judge holds an office of the people and speaks in the
people’s name.”288 Judges likewise must often explain their decisions to
others.289 The institutional setting is designed to promote accountability.
Judges should, therefore, also be susceptible to the responsibility-enhancing
effect of a properly stated verbal standard of proof. Although at least one
researcher has criticized the preponderance standard as setting too low a
level of accountability for civil trials,290 that is not the same as saying that it
establishes no level of responsibility. Surely a formulation below even the
preponderance standard would then decrease the sense of responsibility
even further. That can be particularly dangerous at the level of the
magistrate approving a warrant application because of the ex parte nature of
that application and the lack of a need to write a judicial opinion291—the
writing of opinions being a way to increase the actual and the psychological
sense of accountability.292 Preponderance thus seems an acceptable floor
without creating undue burdens on the state.293
Ultimately, however, setting the standard of proof is a value judgment.
In freestanding due process terms, what procedures should be chosen as fair
for a particular context turn on the size of the individual or group interest
invaded, the risk of erroneous deprivation if other procedures are chosen,
the probable value of additional protections, and the cost to the government,
at least in fiscal and administrative terms.294 There is little data available in
the probable cause context to inform the question of administrative costs to
the state. The state will still have to apply for warrants or face suppression
286

See id. at 454–57, 465–66.
Id. at 463.
288 Id.
289 See Christoph Engel, The Psychological Case for Obliging Judges to Write Reasons,
in THE IMPACT OF COURT PROCEDURE ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
73, 88–89, 92 (Christoph Engel & Fritz Strack eds., 2007).
290 See Engel, supra note 83, at 463–64 (stating that under the preponderance of the
evidence standard, “[a]ccountability is reduced to avoiding gross errors”).
291 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 87, at 238–39 (discussing warrant procedures).
292 See Engel, supra note 289, at 75–79.
293 Further support for the proposition that the preponderance standard does not create an
undue burden comes from the number of judges who seem to embrace it without complaint.
See supra text accompanying notes 256–258.
294 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Steven M. Salky & Blair Brown,
The Preponderance of Evidence Standard at Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 907, 911–18
(1992) (using the Eldridge test to determine the proper standard of proof in the sentencing
phase of criminal cases).
287
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hearings, no matter how the standard of proof is defined—though
conceivably a higher standard means more defendants will see the prospect
of success on suppression motions, increasing the numbers of such motions
filed.295 A fair guess, however, is that defendants have every reason to seek
suppression in the first place if they have a plausible claim. There is always
the chance of success and, even without success, suppression hearings
afford defendants discovery that the stingy discovery rules in criminal cases
otherwise do not afford. Tinkering with the standard of proof does not
change this calculus.296
The risk of erroneous deprivation is not only the chance of a factual
error (e.g., believing that the police took actions they in fact did not) but, if
risk is defined as it is above, the chance of error given the values at stake.297
The disparate impact of police investigations on minority communities can
undermine law enforcement effectiveness and respect for the law in the
long run, as courts have sometimes recognized and as much empirical
evidence supports.298 Police officers’ factual mistakes about probable cause
also seem to be higher in minority communities.299 Apart from racial
disparities, however, in the context of third-party records, the whole point
of a statutory solution is that the Court has woefully misunderstood privacy
and its social value, especially in an electronic age.300 The Standards
require probable cause only where the individual’s privacy interests are at
their maximum.301 Setting the standard of proof at a preponderance seems
consistent with the gravity of these interests. If probable cause so
understood causes too much interference with law enforcement
295 Cf. Donald Dripps, The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: From “Still Preoccupied
With 1985” to “Virtual Deterrence,” 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 768–72 (2010). Dripps
found that, despite the exclusionary rule and Dripps’s conclusion that in practice the standard
of proof for probable cause hovers around 50%, hit rates for searches with warrants are
substantially higher than for warrantless searches. For example, warrant-based hit rates
range from 74% to 89% but warrantless hit rates hover below 50%. Implicitly applying an
objective notion of probability, Dripps seems to suggest that these higher hit rates for
warrant-based searches reflect a kind of “probable-cause-plus” standard of proof because
they well exceed the 50% expected success rate required by probable cause.
296 See 2 P ETER J. HENNING ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
ADJUDICATORY STAGE 129–30 (2012) (discussing limited discovery available in most
criminal cases).
297 See supra text accompanying note 294.
298 See Taslitz, supra note 183, at 93.
299 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to
Convicting the Innocent: The Informants’ Example, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1124–31 (2008)
(reviewing data suggesting that police and magistrates may grant warrants against black
suspects on much less reliable evidence than warrants issued against white suspects).
300 See supra text accompanying notes 1–5, 42–48.
301 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS §§ 25-5.2(a)(i), 25-5.3(a)(i) (2012).
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effectiveness, the Standards allow the legislature to lower the level of proof
to reasonable suspicion.302 Given the importance of the interests at stake,
however, the burden of showing such law enforcement need should be on
the state, and the “escape option” should rarely and reluctantly be chosen—
though critics of this option fear that it will swallow the rule for highly
protected information as a politically feasible alternative.303
6. Reasonable Suspicion and the Standard of Proof
The above analysis applies equally, with slight modifications, to the
“reasonable suspicion” concept. The Court has defined reasonable
suspicion as lower in quality and quantity than probable cause but has
otherwise provided no more guidance than it has with respect to probable
cause concerning what quality and quantity are required.304 As with
probable cause, the Court seems reluctant to identify a specific and fixed
standard of proof for reasonable suspicion.305 Lower court judges seem,
however, to assign on average a roughly one-third likelihood of a suspect’s
guilt or of evidence’s being found in a specific location.306 If this is meant
as an objective probability concept, it suffers all the same flaws as it does in
the probable cause context. If this standard of proof often used in practice
refers to subjective probability, it suffers from the difficulties of creating a
useful metaphor by which decisionmakers can make sense of the concept—
as was discussed of below-50% standards of proof for probable cause.307
Still, perhaps the concept can be given some comprehensible meaning in
comparison to the preponderance standard. Thus, it might be possible to
conceive of a scale tipping heavily to one side but moved to tip one-third of
the way toward tipping entirely to the other side and treating that as
sufficient for reasonable suspicion. This still seems quite a challenging task
to me, lacking the benefits of relying on our frequent use of metaphors of
balance in our broader culture.308 Nevertheless, if the courts are to take
seriously the high Court’s definition of reasonable suspicion, there may be
no choice but to try in the area of current constitutional law. Moreover,
despite claiming to do otherwise, the Court implicitly acknowledges that
some standard is needed by saying that reasonable suspicion is lower in

302

See supra text accompanying notes 53–54.
At least this was the fear expressed by opponents of the escape option when it was
debated in the drafting committee.
304
See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1990).
305 Id.
306 See McCauliff, supra note 104, at 1328 tbl.4.
307 See supra text accompanying notes 75–82, 151–156, 270–273.
308 See supra text accompanying notes 260–275.
303
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quantity than probable cause.309
But Christopher Slobogin has suggested a way around the problem,
one that would better govern constitutional law but one that can even now
be written into statutory definitions of the relevant terms. Slobogin would
redefine “probable cause” to mean an “articulable belief that a search will
more likely than not produce significant evidence of wrongdoing” and
“reasonable suspicion” as an “articulable belief that a search will more
likely than not lead to evidence of wrongdoing.”310 By redefining probable
cause as a belief that evidence of wrongdoing will be found and reasonable
suspicion as a belief that evidence leading to evidence of wrongdoing will
be found, Slobogin clarifies the distinction between the terms. The
justification for a lower standard for reasonable suspicion than probable
cause is that the police need to be free to investigate—to develop evidence
sufficient for probable cause—if they are to combat crime. Yet some limits
on their investigations are required to protect rights to privacy, property,
and free movement. The “lead to” evidence language captures well this
idea of preliminary investigation. But this clarifying definitional move also
allows Slobogin to apply the preponderance standard to both probable cause
and reasonable suspicion, avoiding the metaphorical confusion wrought by
the Court’s current approach.
Remember, however, that objective probabilities can play some role in
subjective probability assessments.311 Crime data collection and modeling
are playing an increasing role in ordinary policing.312 Although the science
has a long way to go, it increasingly is used for various types of “predictive
policing”—policing aimed at preventing future crime or at spotting crime
where it is expected to occur but has not yet come to fruition.313 Because
predictive policing is about catching crime before it occurs or preventing
it—the very concerns underlying the creation of the reasonable suspicion
concept314—this sort of policing has particular relevance to reasonable
suspicion.315 Yet as Fourth Amendment scholar Andrew Ferguson points
out, reasonable suspicion still must be individualized suspicion.316
Moreover, the Court has never said that reasonable suspicion should be less

309

See White, 496 U.S. at 330.
See Slobogin, supra note 27, at 21–23.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 218–225.
312 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62
EMORY L.J. 259, 265–70 (2012).
313 See id.
314 See id. at 265–269, 287.
315 See id. at 287.
316 See id. at 287–292.
310
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individualized than probable cause,317 and little in logic or policy would
support such a move.318 Explains Ferguson, therefore, predictive policing,
even if perfected, should generally be only a factor in developing
reasonable suspicion but cannot be considered sufficient absent more
individualized proof.319
It is hard to make sense of the Court’s assertion that the quality of
evidence of reasonable suspicion can be less than that for probable cause.
Perhaps the reference can be understood in terms of the relationship
between weight and the standard of proof. The weight of evidence, a
concept elaborated below, is a measure of its completeness and its quality
(its error rate, if known; the credibility of its sources; and its general
trustworthiness).320 Although, as some philosophers conceive of the
concept, increasing or decreasing the weight of evidence does not
necessarily tip judgment toward or away from the standard of proof, weight
usually indeed affects that judgment.321 In other words, using the scale
317

See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1990) (describing reasonable suspicion
as less demanding than probable cause in terms of the quality and quantity of information
required, but not mentioning any difference in the degree of individualization).
318 See Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 173–85.
319 See Ferguson, supra note 312, at 38–40 (“[N]o matter the type of predictive
information (tip, profile, or high crime area), the information alone is never enough to
control the reasonable suspicion analysis.”). Erica Goldberg, on the other hand, argues that
certain types of objective probability data can themselves individualize suspicion, even to
the point of establishing probable cause. See Goldberg, supra note 120, at 25–43. To clarify
her position, assume that fingerprinting, DNA analysis, or dog-sniffing of contraband is
100% accurate. If so, then finding a print matching a defendant’s fingerprints in a home at a
burglary scene (if he had no permission to be in the home), the defendant’s DNA in semen in
a rape case, or a dog alerting to drugs in a car trunk in a cocaine-possession case would all
establish probable cause. That would be true both using objective and subjective ideas of
probability. Of course, as Goldberg recognizes, in the real world there are error rates and
they may substantially complicate the analysis. See id. at 22–31. I view error rates as most
relevant to the qualitative inquiry of probable cause determination, as discussed in the next
section of this Article. Goldberg rejects, as does Ferguson, the use of “group-based”
statistics as alone being insufficient to establish the individualization necessary for
reasonable suspicion and probable cause. See id. at 20–22. She does, however, accept for
situations outside of the ones where individualized objective data is available that objective
quantitative analysis cannot control. But she also accepts Kerr’s idea that unexplained
intuition can be decisive and that there should be no standard of proof in many (Kerr would
say all) probable cause analyses, positions I reject in this Article. See id. at 45–58. Nor does
Goldberg examine, as I do here, subjective probability as the conception that should and
does in practice govern probable cause nor the relationship between subjective and objective
probabilities.
320 See infra text accompanying notes 347–401.
321 See infra text accompanying notes 350–351, 393–395. Other philosophers, such as
true Bayesians, view weight as a part of the probability calculus—not separate from it. But I
agree with William Twining and his colleagues that these differing conceptions of weight are
usefully understood as each having a useful role in the practical tasks of the law. See
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metaphor, more complete and trustworthy evidence usually “weighs more,”
thus tipping the scales closer toward meeting the standard of proof. But if
the standard of proof for reasonable suspicion (say, 33 1/3%) is less than
that for probable cause, as the Court seems to conceive of it, then less
weighty evidence than that needed for probable cause (that is, evidence
adding up to something less than around 50% probability of guilt) might
suffice. Intuitively, however, this makes little sense, at least to me. For
example, suppose that sound science showed that dogs sniffing for cocaine
were wrong 80% of the time while junk science purportedly showed that
dogs were instead accurate 80% of the time. Would it make sense for a
judge to say, “Well, for reasonable suspicion, I can rely on lower quality
evidence, so I will accept the junk science and find that the dog’s sniff here
establishes at least reasonable suspicion”?322 Whether applying an
objective or subjective notion of probability, the Court should only be

ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 250–61 (discussing different conceptions of weight).
Rephrased, much like the blind man feeling different parts of the elephant, different
conceptions of weight convey different aspects of or perspectives on reality, all of which are
useful and only all of which together provide a full picture of what the legal “elephant”
(here, probable cause or reasonable suspicion) looks like. See id. at 261 (“In summary, we
have provided four quite different interpretations of what is meant by the probative force,
weight, or strength of evidence. Each view tells us something valuable about this important
credential of evidence, but no single view says all there is to be said.”). I am thus not
concerned if some thinkers see an inconsistency between my referring to weight both as a
concept distinct from rationally critiqued subjective probability judgments and
simultaneously as part of those judgments. Moreover, even if “weight” is not considered in
some technical sense as distinct from subjective probability as here discussed, treating
weight as if it is separate allows for greater clarity when then returning to discuss how it may
in fact affect probability judgments; lawyers certainly speak of weight and probability as
different yet connected concepts.
322 Perhaps the best way to understand this discussion is really as a question of the
completeness, quality, and persuasiveness of the evidence. Let us vary the hypothetical
above and assume that a nationwide sample of drug-sniffing dogs showed a 75% false
positive rate. In an individual case, however, a local officer claims that his impression is that
his local police force’s false positive rate is only 50% based upon his experience. That
seems to cry out, however, for empirical data supporting such a statement. Although the
statement alone suggests a 50% probability, the statement is based on incomplete evidence,
thus weak weight. Contrast this example with one in which the prosecution in fact produces
a well-designed study involving a statistically significant random sample of local police dog
success rates. That study indeed shows a 50% local false positive rate. Now the evidence is
complete and thus weightier. It still does not, however, necessarily establish probable cause
that a particular defendant committed a crime or possessed contraband because one local
police dog alerted to that defendant. That one alert is a unique situation in the realm of
probable cause determination, and thus is not subject to frequentist probability judgments
alone. The ultimate question is one of what rational inferences support a subjective
probability judgment that this individual defendant is guilty or possesses the contraband,
though frequentist probability judgments may help to inform that analysis. I thank Professor
Charles Yablon for this example in his comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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relying on quality evidence in deciding whether the standard of proof is
met. Alternatively, if low-quality evidence is to be considered in the
analysis nevertheless, it should be understood as, at least alone, barely to
move the scales of justice.
Slobogin’s concept of reasonable suspicion simplifies and clarifies the
analysis. Evidence must still be fairly complete and of significant probative
value but in proving something different from probable cause: the mere
likelihood of leading to evidence of wrongdoing. But evidence “leading to”
probable cause certainly can be less complete and less probative than that
needed to show probable cause—significant evidence of wrongdoing—
itself.
7. Application to Third-Party Electronic Records
Paul Ohm, in his article arguing that probable cause almost always
exists in crimes involving the Internet, relies primarily on one subcategory,
what I have here labeled “cybercrimes”—crimes committed via the
Internet.323 For many such crimes, he is right. For example, if a computer
is used to hack another computer or fraud or threats are sent by e-mail, the
combination of log files and Internet addresses usually readily traces to an
IP address handled by an ISP.324 That creates probable cause to believe that
the provider has information tying the threat or lie to a specific customer’s
computer.325 More investigation may be needed to link a specific person to
the communication made using that computer at the relevant time. But
probable cause to seek records from the ISP is established.326
But this is far from always true. Thus a heuristic intrusion-detection
system may be used to identify things that look like malware.327 Such
323

See Ohm, supra note 17, at 1525.
See id. at 1525–27 (offering other examples).
325 See id. at 1526–35.
326 Cf. JOHN OLSSON, WORDCRIME: SOLVING CRIME THROUGH FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 123
(2009) (giving examples of multiple users of a single computer in a criminal investigation).
327 Another term for a “heuristic intrusion detection system” is “anomaly based intrusion
detection.” See CHARLES P. PFLEEGER & SHARI LAWRENCE PFLEEGER, SECURITY IN
COMPUTING 468 (3d ed. 2003) (“An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a device, typically
another separate computer, that monitors activity to identify malicious or suspicious
events.”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 469 (“Heuristic intrusion detection systems, also known
as anomaly based, build a model of acceptable behavior and flag exceptions to that
model . . . .”); id. at 470 (“Because signatures are limited to specific, known attack patterns,
another form of intrusion detection becomes useful. Instead of looking for matches,
heuristic intrusion detection looks for behavior that is out of the ordinary.”); BAIJU SHAH,
SANS INST. INFOSEC READING ROOM, HOW TO CHOOSE INTRUSION DETECTION SOLUTION,
(2001), available at http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/detection/chooseintrusion-detection-solution_334 (offering further detail on heuristic intrusion detection
systems). “Malware” is “software intended to damage a computer system.” See Definitions
324
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systems are needed because malware is always changing.328 The system’s
accuracy depends on the accuracy of the algorithm it uses.329 To catch
more potential malware—to be a safer system—the algorithm should sweep
more broadly. But broader algorithms will generate more false positives.330
The error rate may be sufficiently high that it is consistent with reasonable
suspicion but not probable cause that malware was in fact used (that is, that
any crime was committed at all), regardless of its source.331
Another example would be using a robust hash algorithm to identify
potential copyright infringement.332 For example, YouTube uses a content
identification system to monitor copyright violations.333 Thus YouTube
might want to determine whether a band’s downloaded song is a rip-off of a
Van Halen tune, despite the song having been modified slightly to reduce
the chances of detection. While traditional hash algorithms might establish
probable cause, these more robust algorithms—designed, for example, to
detect not simply Van Halen’s precise tunes but tunes “close enough” to
implicate the copyright laws—might have significant error rates, again
creating a question whether a crime has occurred.334
Now imagine that a user meaning to send an e-mail to Mr. A
accidentally sends it to Mr. B. The words used in the e-mail are ordinary
words but ones that can sometimes serve as code for ordering child
pornography.335 Is there probable cause to believe that a crime has
of ‘Malware,’ ASK, http://www.ask.com/dictionary?q=malware&qsrc=999&o=3966 (last
visited May 16, 2013). My thanks to Stephen Henderson for suggesting this malware
example and all the examples to follow other than those discussing “ordinary crime.”
328
See Tim Wilson, Next-Generation Malware: Changing the Game in Security’s
Operations Center, SECURITY DARK READING (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.darkreading.com/
security-monitoring/167901086/security/security-management/240009058/next-generationmalware-changing-the-game-in-security-s-operations-center.html (“In a quiet, secluded spot,
a malware author is creating a new piece of code that no antivirus tool has ever seen before.
It’s not a particularly creative exploit—just a slight tweak on an existing Trojan—but it
should be enough to bypass the signature-based defenses of the company he’s targeting.”).
329 ALEXIS CORT, SANS INST. INFOSEC READING ROOM, ALGORITHM-BASED APPROACHES
TO INTRUSION DETECTION AND RESPONSE 12 (2004), available at http://www.sans.org/
reading_room/whitepapers/detection/algorithm-based-approaches-intrusion-detectionresponse_1413.
330 See PFLEEGER & PFLEEGER, supra note 327.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.
332 See Jiri Fridrich & Miroslav Goljan, Robust Hash Functions for Digital Watermarking
(2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mathcs.emory.edu/~whalen/Hash/
Hash_Articles/IEEE/Robust hash functions for digital watermarking.pdf.
333
See Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited May 16,
2013).
334 See Fridrich & Goljan, supra note 332; E-mail from Stephen Henderson to Andrew E.
Taslitz (Jan. 8, 2013) (on file with author).
335 Cf. United States v. Cancelmo, 64 F.3d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing how the
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occurred? The answer might in part depend upon consulting experts336 but,
even then, a sufficiently ambiguous e-mail might establish reasonable
suspicion but not probable cause.337
In each of these three examples, evidence can individualize a
purported crime to an ISP, but there is arguably less than probable cause
concerning whether the activity was criminal in the first place. Determining
whether the available evidence in each case in fact rises to the level of
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or something less is a subjective
probability judgment based upon commonsense arguments but does require
some sense of how confidently those judgments must be held, that is, a
standard of proof.338
Other times, the link to an ISP involves circumstances where the
objective probabilities are sufficiently low to call into question whether
there is probable cause that evidence of a specific wrongdoer’s crime will
be found. A single IP address can sometimes accommodate multiple other
websites indicated by subaddresses.339 If the ISP keeps records of the IP
address associated with a fraudulent communication but does not keep the
subaddresses—and there are many candidates—and the police are aware of
this fact, police knowing the ISP link may not establish probable cause.
Alternatively, suppose that someone sends a letter to a news reporter
claiming to be the “real” serial killer sought by the police. The letter writer
use of alleged narcotics code words cannot generally be solely sufficient for establishing
probable cause, though it is relevant and can sometimes be sufficient when combined with
other circumstances); Mehagen Doyle, Bad Apples in Cyberspace: The Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse of Children over the Internet, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 119, 129 (1999) (“Many
search engines use hidden computer codes to identify sites, relying on keywords and
descriptions which are coded by the website operators, but are not visible to people viewing
the site. [I]n an effort to increase traffic to their sites (and thus advertising revenue),
pornographic web site operators use popular terms.” (internal citation omitted) (alterations in
original)).
336 See OLSSON, supra note 326, at 68–73 (providing an example of an expert forensic
linguist discussing a case in which he analyzed coded letters sent to a child by a defendant in
an effort to sexually harass and seduce her).
337 Cf. Cancelmo, 64 F.3d at 808 (finding that coded drug language alone is insufficient
for probable cause).
338 See supra text accompanying notes 254–255.
339 This process is known as “virtual hosting.” See Apache Virtual Host Documentation,
APACHE, http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/vhosts/ (last visited May 16, 2013) (“The term
Virtual Host refers to the practice of running more than one web site (such as
company1.example.com and company2.example.com) on a single machine. Virtual hosts
can be ‘IP-based’, meaning that you have a different IP address for every web site, or ‘namebased’, meaning that you have multiple names running on each IP address. The fact that
they are running on the same physical server is not apparent to the end user.”); Virtual
Hosting, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_hosting (last modified Apr. 4,
2013, 1:54 PM).
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attaches a map downloaded from Mapquest of a broad area but marks a
specific spot as where the body will be found. Assuming that at least ten
people mapped that same location via Mapquest in the past thirty days—a
very reasonable assumption for a suburban town—the objective
probabilities would not establish probable cause.340 More evidence, of less
purely mathematical relevance, would be needed.
Perhaps most important, however, is the category of ordinary crimes—
those not committed via computer at all—but for which evidence may be
found via the Internet and its electronic cousins.341 If a murder were
committed by a gang beating a bicyclist, a fingerprint might lead to one
gang member who refuses to confess or identify his coconspirators.342 The
police might speculate that text messages were sent at the time among the
offenders. They cannot locate the identified gang member’s phone, so they
want to “triangulate” among cell phone towers using an ISP’s records to
locate other phones used in the area at the time of the crime.343 That
speculation is not probable cause and arguably not even reasonable
suspicion. If either of those standards applied, more evidence would be
needed. Perhaps an arsonist or a rapist keeps an Internet journal or diary
stored on the cloud.344 Police would need a quality tip, eyewitness
corroboration, or other evidence to have reasonable suspicion or probable
cause that the diary or journal was kept and so stored. Indeed, most nonwhite-collar crime is not committed using records stored with ISPs. Yet in
an increasingly technological world, evidence of those ordinary crimes is
likely to be available somewhere on the Internet.345
Finally, even if probable cause is easily shown, that does not mean that
it should not be required or that it should be relegated to secondary
importance. If probable cause involves a significant standard of proof and
is accompanied by the requirements of high-quality information, police
340

See supra text accompanying notes 207–210.
See infra text accompanying notes 396–399.
342 This example modifies, but is inspired by, a real case worked on by forensic linguist
John Olsson. See OLSSON, supra note 326, at 11–12.
343 Jeremy Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell
Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 494 (2012) (explaining the
process of triangulation).
344 These examples are also inspired by Olsson. See OLSSON, supra note 326, at 34, 86.
345 See LARRY DANIEL & LARS DANIEL, DIGITAL FORENSICS FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS:
UNDERSTANDING DIGITAL EVIDENCE FROM THE WARRANT TO THE COURTROOM 1–30 (2012)
(recounting the degree to which digital evidence and digital traces are ubiquitous and
therefore widely important for forensic purposes); JOHN SAMMONS, THE BASICS OF DIGITAL
FORENSICS: THE PRIMER FOR GETTING STARTED IN DIGITAL FORENSICS 3 (2012) (“In today’s
digital world, electronic evidence can be found in almost any criminal investigation
conducted. Homicide, sexual assault, robbery, and burglary are just a few of the many
examples of ‘analog’ crimes that can leave digital evidence.”).
341
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accountability, and individualized justice, numerous benefits follow.
Important constraints are placed on the risk of police abuses, respect for law
via fair procedures is enhanced, and law enforcement itself can be prodded
to embrace a culture of respect for constitutional values and of the
professionalism requiring careful attention to evidence and hesitation before
too readily invading privacy.346
B. THE QUALITATIVE ELEMENT OF PROOF: EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT

Probable cause turns not only on the quantity but also the quality of the
evidence. The concept of “weight” illuminates the idea of quality.
Evidentiary weight has two components: the completeness of the evidence
and its trustworthiness.347 If the probable cause inquiry is based on
incomplete evidence, the resulting finding that there is or is not probable
cause is suspect because the story of suspected criminality is missing key
chapters. On the other hand, even if the story is complete, it will merit little
consideration if it does not make sense, that is, if it is based on incredible,
tainted, or shoddy evidence.
1. Weight and Evidentiary Completeness
The probability that something is so is not the only thing that controls
whether a standard of proof has been met. The “weight” of the evidence
also matters.348 Just as there are different concepts of probability, however,
there are different concepts of weight.349 The most helpful one here defines
weight as “the total amount of evidence supporting a probability judgment,
even if that evidence is distributed relatively evenly for and against a
particular outcome.”350 Weight thus refers to the degree of completeness of
the evidence offered to test a hypothesis.351 Thus in Kerr’s dorm room
example, being told that the police conducted an empirical study finding
that 60% of the dorm rooms in a particular university contained drugs
merits little weight if we do not know what procedures were used, what the

346

See Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29, at 175–85.
See infra text accompanying notes 347–399.
348 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 226, 229–30, 247, 250–61. Under some
conceptions, “weight” is a truly distinct concept from probability; under other conceptions, it
is but one aspect of the probability determination. For my purposes and the practical
purposes of the law, which is the correct idea of weight is irrelevant. The gist of my
argument would remain the same, and naming weight as a separate concept is a handy, quick
way of describing important phenomena in a way that is of practical value. See id.
349 See id. at 227–29, 260–61.
350 Yablon, supra note 142, at 916.
351 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 259.
347
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sample size was, and over what period of time the study was conducted.352
Even if we know these things, as Kerr points out, we also may want to
know why the police suspect this defendant of being in the 60% guilty
group rather than the 40% innocent group, what case-specific investigation
of the defendant the police conducted and its result or, if they did not do
such an investigation, why not.353
Considering additional evidence might change the probability of a
proposition’s being true but might not. Weight is thus independent of
probability.354 The weight of two probability judgments can be given rank
order—one judgment is “weightier” than another—but weight cannot
usefully be assigned a mathematical value.355 “Yet it is worth noting that
much of what both lawyers and scientists purport to do, each in their
respective field, is evaluate the weight of the evidence put forward to
support various uncertain factual propositions.”356
L. Jonathan Cohen’s version of “Baconian” probability theory
incorporates this idea of weight.357 The details of his theory and of its
formal representation are not important here. What is important is that he
and his supporters argue that Baconian probability judgments that take this
conception of weight into account most accurately reflect how most people
and institutions, including the courts, think about the probability of unique
events.358 They thus see efforts to explain the preponderance of the
evidence standard in terms of objective probabilities as wanting, the
standard instead embracing Baconian weight-informed approaches.359 The
sentencing hearing testimony of a clinical psychologist concluding to a
reasonable degree of professional certainty, for example, that a defendant
committed a crime because he was depressed but without investigating the
facts supporting other relevant, plausible diagnoses or the individualized
causes of the final chosen diagnosis would deserve little weight.360
Standards of proof commonly used in law should thus be understood as
embracing ideas of both subjective probability and weight. This too may be
one reason why these standards are not stated in precise mathematical terms

352

See supra text accompanying notes 97–99 (summarizing Kerr’s example).
See supra text accompanying notes 102–103 (summarizing Kerr’s analysis of the
example).
354 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 916.
355 See id. at 916–17.
356 Id. at 917.
357
See L. Jonathan Cohen, On the Psychology of Prediction: Whose Is the Fallacy?, 7
COGNITION 385, 388 (1979).
358 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 919.
359 See id.
360 See Taslitz, supra note 223, at 72–81; Yablon, supra note 142, at 929.
353
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(and perhaps should not be so explained) but rather are given verbal
formulations believed to do the job.
So understood, Kerr’s concerns about the completeness of evidence
offered to a judge making a probable cause judgment are better seen as
questions of weight than probability.361 That recategorization makes the
concerns no less valid. But real judges are likely to incorporate judgments
of weight and probability not in any formalistic way but rather through
storytelling.362 Kahneman and Tversky seemed to recognize the importance
of storytelling in how subjective probability judgments are actually made:
Some events are perceived as so unique that past history does not seem relevant to the
evaluation of their likelihood. In thinking of such events we often construct
scenarios, i.e., stories that lead from the present situation to the target event. The
plausibility of the scenarios that come to mind, or the difficulty of producing them,
then serve as a clue to the likelihood of the event. If no reasonable scenario comes to
mind, the event is deemed impossible or highly unlikely. If many scenarios come to
mind, or if the one scenario that is constructed is particularly compelling, the event in
question appears probable.363

Kahneman and Tversky stressed the dangers that heuristics might lead
a storyteller or interpreter to consider too few relevant factors in crafting a
story or to craft simpler rather than more convincing but more complex
scenarios. A probability judgment made without considering all relevant
data and its implications merits little weight.364 While stories can
sometimes leave us subject to the prey of heuristics not appropriate for the
situation,365 storytelling is ultimately central to most people’s reasoning,
including that of judges and juries.366 Stories are judged in part on their
coverage (accounting for all the evidence), coherence (plausibility,
consistency, and completeness), and uniqueness (superiority to alternative
competing stories).367
But storytelling is not simply a way to find raw “facts” or render
judgments of probability and weight. Stories too embody values and
reaffirm or challenge existing social norms.368 When juries or judges
decide witness credibility, evidentiary weight, and guilt probability in rape
361

See supra text accompanying notes 100–103 (discussing Kerr’s views on the point).
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 148, 152, 155.
363 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 230, at 177.
364 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 929.
365 See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 219.
366 See LISA CRON, WIRED FOR STORY: THE WRITER’S GUIDE TO USING BRAIN SCIENCE TO
HOOK READERS FROM THE VERY FIRST SENTENCE 1 (2012) (“Story, as it turns out, was
crucial to our evolution—more so than opposable thumbs.”); Engel, supra note 83, at 451–
53 (“Jurors attempt to create a narrative story from the pieces of evidence they have heard.”).
367 See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 111, at 220.
368 See Taslitz, supra note 260, at 434–39.
362
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cases, they either embrace antifeminist or more liberating stories drawing
on tales already circulating in society.369 The law may try to prod a
factfinder toward favoring certain kinds of stories over others, but some
story must be chosen. This is, however, as it should be. In criminal law,
many legal standards are phrased precisely to invite partly moral or valuebased judgments.370 Words like “reasonable,” “consent,” and “deliberate”
are rarely defined in a precise way, leaving ample room for the play of
moral judgments.371 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, often defined
in terms of “moral certainty,”372 is a similar invitation.373 Indeed, any
verbally (rather than mathematically) articulated standard of proof invites
values-infused storytelling.374 The same is likely true in the probable cause
determination.375 Judges’ decisions about whether there is probable cause
inevitably involve judgments about how convincing the stories told in the
detectives’ affidavits are.376 But that judgment will involve some inevitable
sense of the acceptability of the police conduct as a question of political
morality.377 Kerr seems to recognize this when he assumes that judges will
369

See id. at 421–22, 474–75.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence:
Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 2–11 (1998).
371 See PODGOR ET AL., supra note 70, at 131–32 (defining “deliberate” in the test for
first-degree murder); Taslitz, supra note 260, at 422–24 (discussing “consent”); Taslitz,
Willfully Blinded, supra note 146, at 384–88 (discussing “reasonableness”).
372 Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850).
373 See Engel, supra note 83, at 436–38, 441–42.
374 See id. at 450–55.
375 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 17, 246, 260 (making no distinction on this
score between probable cause, preponderance of the evidence, and beyond a reasonable
doubt).
376 John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party
Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1104–06 (2007)
(arguing that probable cause as used in the warrant context is inherently narrative in nature
and thus serves as a good standard for whether a defendant should be allowed to tell a story
of third-party guilt at trial); Myron Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1049 (1987)
(“Critics of the exclusionary rule maintain that police perjury neutralizes the effectiveness of
the exclusionary rule in practice. They argue both that police can deceive judges with
convincing probable cause stories and that judges often ‘wink’ at perjury in order to permit
the convictions of guilty defendants.”).
377 See Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 582
(2007) (“So we find that our search for meaning as to the elusive term ‘probable cause’ leads
us straight to the center of the political earth.”); id. at 587 (“I propose that the judge consult
not the ablest and purest of men, but instead seek to understand the process by which the
governed functions in its most able and pure state to reach a rational consensus about the
core values of justice probable cause exists to serve.”); id. at 596 (“Probable cause is a
search for a point along a continuum that cannot be calculated in decimals. Instead, it
measures the delicate balance of human freedom and government power in the society we
370
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wonder about the bad faith of detectives obviously leaving out important
information. Yet standards of proof, while inviting stories, send messages
about the kinds of stories that are acceptable.378 More precisely, higher
standards of proof tell a factfinder to look for greater weight of the evidence
and a higher belief in subjective probability of accuracy than do lower
standards.379
Setting a standard of proof in the probable cause
determination can focus judges more emphatically on questions of weight
(evidentiary completeness) and degree (subjective probability).380 Some
stories are better than others.
The Court certainly has recognized the role of weight considerations in
the probable cause determination, most clearly in its analysis of informants.
In moving from the Aguilar–Spinelli standard to the Gates standard for
addressing informants’ tips, the Court moved from a rule of admissibility to
one of weight.381 Tips failing the old Aguilar–Spinelli standard simply
could not be considered in the probable cause determination.382 But under
Gates, tips are considered for whatever they are worth in the totality of the
circumstances.383 But the Court did not leave judges without guidance on
the question of weight. To the contrary, Gates still requires courts to
consider all evidence relevant under Aguilar–Spinelli in deciding what
weight to give a tip.384 Gates, its predecessors, and its progeny provide
checklists of many of the inquiries courts should make.385 These checklists
can serve as a guide to evidentiary completeness or weight. Restated, they
also serve as a guide to what courts must evaluate in crafting convincing
probable cause stories. I prefer the admissibility approach to the weight
approach because the former gives police more guidance and better
channels and limits their discretion.386 They also limit the sorts of stories
lower courts may tell.387 Complete elimination of police or factfinder
discretion is, however, neither feasible nor desirable. The question is

have created.”); Davies, supra note 199, at 974 (noting that some Justices have historically
fractured ideologically over the meaning of probable cause).
378 See supra text accompanying notes 67–88, 96–99.
379 See supra text accompanying notes 243–303, 346–376.
380 See supra text accompanying notes 244–256, 346–355.
381 See HENNING ET AL., supra note 296, at 52.
382 See id.
383 See id.
384 See id.
385
See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 87, at 186, 197–214.
386 See id. at 211–16.
387 Cf. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 241, 253 (concluding that appellate precedent
in many instances plays a greater role in limiting the influence of ideology on trial courts
than on appellate courts).
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always one of degree.388 But in expanding the sphere of judicial and officer
discretion in Gates, the Court could have given no guidance whatsoever.
Instead, it crafted a template, if not a set of rules, for evaluating weight.389
Kerr’s concern about the incompleteness of evidence could thus be
reimagined as a call to the Court to expand its weight template. Perhaps
lower courts should be required to inquire of police just what other
investigation was done and its results or what investigation could have been
done and its potential results.390 Courts are competent to evaluate these
questions or will become so over time.391 If they fail to make the necessary
inquiries in granting warrants, suppression courts might exclude evidence
precisely because of the incompleteness of the evidence described in the
warrant affidavit. A greater emphasis on weight thus looks not only to the
affirmative case made by the police but to what evidence is missing and
why.
2. Weight, Evidentiary Quality, and Trustworthiness
There is another sense in which the concept of weight might be used in
the probable cause determination: as an assessment of the “quality” of
individual items of evidence. Return to the scale metaphor. One reason
completeness involves “weight” is that, assuming that each item of
evidence weighs the same, more items of evidence weigh more, tipping the
scale more to one side.392 But some items of evidence might be of better
quality than others so that high-quality individual items “weigh” more than
low-quality items. That too would tip the scale.
“Quality” of evidence, loosely stated, refers to its trustworthiness and
strength.393 For example, expert evidence could be based on a novel, barely
388 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 160–203 (discussing degrees of discretion in rulebased versus role-based authority).
389 Unfortunately, as noted earlier, the Court in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330
(1990), declared that evidentiary quality, not merely evidentiary quantity, could be lower in
the reasonable suspicion than the probable cause determination. But incomplete and shoddy
evidence raises the same concerns about the value of any reasonable suspicion judgment as it
does of any probable cause judgment. The Court in White was wrong.
390 These are precisely the main categories of “missing evidence” in the probable cause
determination of which Kerr complains. See supra text accompanying notes 89–103.
391 Courts routinely learn to handle much more complex matters than how thorough a
police investigation was or should be in a particular case. For example, courts, under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), must learn the science
underlying a wide array of forensic evidence. It is a happy consequence of the adversarial
system that if courts start demanding certain information to guide their decisions, one or both
of the parties will provide it.
392 This analysis assumes either that weight is distinct from subjective probability but can
still inform it or that weight is but one aspect of probability. See supra notes 347–361.
393 See Yablon, supra note 142, at 903.
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tested theory versus a tried-and-true, well-tested theory. The latter expert
testimony should be entitled to far more weight than the former. In the
language of evidence law, more trustworthy evidence has more “probative
value”—it changes the probabilities that an element to be proven exists
more than less trustworthy evidence does.394
This discussion takes us back to Ohm’s claim that issues of weight and
credibility are unimportant in probable cause and reasonable suspicion
judgments involving searches of computers. Ohm’s mistake once again is
that he focuses on cybercrimes rather than ordinary crimes leaving traces in
the computer world. Thus Ohm argues that there are almost always reliable
witnesses as sources of Internet crime evidence because those witnesses are
“sophisticated corporate intermediaries.”395 But that just is not true for the
vast number of ordinary crimes not committed via computer. In such cases,
police must rely on anonymous informants, confidential informants,
undercover investigations, and just good old-fashioned police detective
work to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion.396 The quality of
the evidence in such cases presents issues little different from investigation
in a precomputer world—a point that Ohm apparently concedes.397 There is
no reason to suppose that ordinary crimes leaving electronic traces are rare.
Even if they are, rapidly changing technology suggests that such cases will
become increasingly important in the future.398 Furthermore, even crimes
committed via the Internet can turn on ordinary investigation. For example,
police may have no reason to suspect an individual of downloading child
pornography until receiving an anonymous tip to that effect.399 The quality
of the tip—the completeness of the information in it and of corroborating
394

See STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 67–69 (5th ed. 2012);
see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 204, at 251–53 (discussing analogous concepts of
“likelihood ratios” and “posterior probabilities” in “Bayes” rule as alternative concepts of
weight). But see Yablon, supra note 142, at 912–15 (explaining the flaws in the work of
scholars who think that these concepts can be the bases for objective probability concepts in
standards of proof).
395 See Ohm, supra note 17, at 1532.
396 See id. at 1515.
397 See id. at 1528–29, 1545–47 (discussing cases that “straddle the virtual and real
worlds”). Ohm mentions other potential exceptions to his “probable-cause-is-mostlyirrelevant” position, including fishing expeditions, preventing future crimes, and data
mining. I touch on these exceptions here and accept the idea that they do not involve
probable cause as traditionally conceived. I add only that I do not develop analysis of those
topics further here because they raise a host of issues beyond the scope of this piece.
398 See supra text accompanying notes 24–26.
399 See OLSSON, supra note 326, at 123 (speculating that police focused on a particular
child pornography downloading suspect in a case the author handled based on an anonymous
tip, though he believed the website itself may have been the tipster—an irrelevant point if the
tip was truly anonymous).
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information and the force or trustworthiness of that information must be
assessed. That assessment will either establish probable cause, reasonable
suspicion, or nothing, all of which are ultimately subjective probability
judgments not resolved by objective mathematical probabilities. The kinds
of analysis involved have been addressed in a vast array of scholarship
outside the cybercrime world400—and even in that world401—and thus need
not be reviewed in depth here. But the bottom line matters: probable cause
or reasonable suspicion must not be based on incomplete or shoddy
evidence. Any other conclusion countenances unjustified invasions of
privacy and property inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s deepest
values.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the meaning and social value of the
quantitative (explained as the standard of proof) and qualitative (explained
as the weight of the supporting evidence) aspects of probable cause. Along
the way, however, this piece has necessarily touched on the individualized
suspicion and accountability aspects of probable cause. As I have explained
elsewhere, individualized suspicion promotes distributive fairness and
procedural justice, while protecting privacy invasions against dragnet-like
searches of large groups or fishing expeditions.402 Accountability promotes
accuracy and ensures democratic safeguards against police overreaching.403
These benefits apply in the world of third-party electronic records searches
just as in the nonvirtual world. This Article has developed at greater length,
however, the meaning and social benefits of the quantitative and qualitative
aspects of probable cause, showing how they matter in third-party records
searches in cybercrimes, but even more so in ordinary crimes leaving a
cybertrail. This inquiry, though made in the context of cybersurveillance,
particularly as illustrated in the new ABA Standards, hopefully has broader
implications.
The cybersurveillance context has thus offered the
opportunity to clarify two occasionally discussed but woefully
400

See, e.g., Peter Erlinder, Florida v. J.L.—Withdrawing Permission to “Lie with
Impunity”: The Demise of “Truly Anonymous” Informants and the Resurrection of the
Aguilar/Spinelli Test for Probable Cause, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2001); Chris La Tronica,
Could You? Should You? Florida v. J.L.: Danger Dicta, Drunken Bombs, and the Universe
of Anonymity, 85 TUL. L. REV. 831 (2011).
401 Cf. Clifford, supra note 24, at 104–05 (giving an example in which the harassing
nature of certain e-mails turned on the presumed reliability of the recipient—a former
girlfriend of the ultimate suspect).
402 See generally Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 29 (analyzing the many
social benefits of individualized suspicion in the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
analyses).
403 See id. at 177–78, 210.
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undertheorized aspects of probable cause, namely, the quantitative and the
qualitative. I hope that this effort sparks further conversation on matters
central to protecting privacy against its many modern threats.
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